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From Policy and Response to
System Design and Operations:
Inter-Governmental Transit
Security Planning in the U.S.
Camille N.Y. Fink, Brian D. Taylor, and Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris
UCLA Institute of Transportation Studies

Abstract
The events of September 11th, 2001, brought the issue of transportation security and
terrorism to the forefront of civil society. Transit security is especially challenging
because of the nature of transit systems as open and accessible public places and
the need to keep these systems running quickly and eﬃciently; transit oﬃcials cannot
employ many of the security strategies used in aviation security. This paper examines
the recent developments in transit security planning in the U.S. using two sources of
data: 1) interviews with oﬃcials from federal agencies, a national transit industry
organization, and local transit agencies, and 2) a nationwide survey of transit operators. The ﬁndings show that transit security remains a major concern for operators
who must work to balance security needs with operations and management goals.
Interagency coordination has become a crucial element of security planning. In addition, environmental design and public outreach and education—two strategies that
received much less attention pre-September 11th—have emerged as much more
important in transit security planning.
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(CNN) – U.S. mass transit systems were put on higher alert after Thursday’s
bombings in London, with oﬃcials in major cities urging Americans to go
about their business but be on the lookout for anything suspicious…. New
York Police Commissioner Ray Kelly told CNN his oﬃcers were “doing
everything that’s prudent, everything that we reasonably can do to protect the city.” But he said it was impossible to put a police oﬃcer “on every
train all the time, or one on every station all the time.” [http://www.cnn.
com/2005/US/07/07/us.response/; posted Thursday, July 17, 2005, 11:41 pm
EDT (03:41 GMT)]

Overview
The events of September 11th, 2001, brought the issue of transportation security
and terrorism to the forefront of civil society. Subsequent attacks—on subways in
Moscow and Madrid and, more recently, on the Underground and bus networks of
London—have further highlighted terrorism as a global threat with public transit
systems as primary targets. While transportation security oﬃcials have long been
aware of the possible threat of terrorist attacks on transportation networks, these
tragic events revealed both vulnerabilities in security systems and the unimaginable consequences of such breaches. Public surface transportation systems are, in
general, easy and eﬀective targets for terrorists; this fact is reﬂected in the relatively
signiﬁcant proportion of attacks occurring on these systems. In 1991, transportation systems were the target of 20 percent of all violent attacks. This rose to almost
40 percent in 1998 (Boyd and Sullivan 2000). In addition, an examination of the
public system targets and tactics used worldwide by terrorists from 1920 to 2000
shows that the largest percentage (46%) of terrorist attacks against public surface
transportation systems was carried out on subways and trains, subway and train
stations, and rail (Jenkins 2001).
The vulnerability of public transit systems lies in the fact that they are very open
and accessible, with ﬁxed, predictable routes and access points. Their openness
and anonymity make it easy for potential terrorists to hide in crowds without
arousing suspicion. Securing such open and public systems presents transit and
security oﬃcials with daunting challenges. The volume of passengers makes it
impossible for transit operators to employ the types of security tactics used in
commercial aviation. Closed system security measures, such as the screening of
passengers and luggage with X-ray machines and metal detectors, hand searches,
passenger proﬁling, dog sniﬀers, armed guards, and the like, would lead to intoler2
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able delays and costs (Balog, Devost, and Sullivan 2002; Jenkins 1997; Boyd and
Sullivan 1997).
Attractive, convenient public transit systems help to mitigate many of the problems of widespread auto use and provide mobility for those who do not have
regular access to automobiles, including youth, the elderly, the disabled, and poor
people. Security measures that cause inconvenience, delay, or added cost to travel
by public transit are likely to shift travelers and cities toward greater dependence
on private vehicles. Given that many transit systems around the U.S. struggle
to control costs, maintain a market share of metropolitan trips, and secure and
maintain stable sources of public subsidy, security measures that diminish the
accessibility, convenience, and/or aﬀordability of transit service conceivably could
threaten the viability of public transit in many places. On the other hand, security
measures that serve to increase the general safety, attractiveness, and reliability
of transit systems without seriously compromising their accessibility are likely to
enhance the attractiveness of public transit to potential riders (United States General Accounting Oﬃce 2002). Thus, while policing, surveillance, and emergency
response will likely remain central to transit security planning, weaving security
planning into transit system design and operations in ways that increase the safety
and attractiveness of transit service oﬀers potentially signiﬁcant beneﬁts to transit
systems and their customers.

This Study
While most decisions about transit services (routing, headways, fares, etc.) are
entirely local, security planning requires transit agencies to work closely with
local law enforcement as well as federal transportation and security oﬃcials. Such
ongoing inter-governmental collaboration, particularly with federal security oﬃcials, is new territory for many transit managers. This paper examines the fruits of
this collaboration since September 11th, with a particular focus on how security
considerations are being incorporated into the planning, design, and operations
of U.S. transit systems.
Our data for this analysis are drawn from two sources. The ﬁrst is interviews conducted either face-to-face or by telephone with oﬃcials from a number of federal
and transit agencies and a transit industry organization; each interview lasted
approximately one hour and involved an open-ended question format. At the
federal level, we spoke with oﬃcials from the Department of Homeland Security
3
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(DHS), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Federal Transit
Administration (FTA), and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). We also
conducted interviews with representatives from the American Public Transportation Association (APTA) and senior staﬀ with several major transit operators,
including the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), Amtrak,
and two other transit agencies that asked to remain anonymous. The geographic
focus of these interviews was the northeastern U.S. We selected this region for
three reasons. First, the cities of the northeastern U.S., and in particular the New
York metropolitan area, are home to, by far, the largest and most heavily patronized networks of public transit systems in the country; metropolitan New York
alone accounted for 39 percent of all transit trips taken in the entire U.S. in 2002
(American Public Transportation Association 2004). Second, while the venue of
the September 11th attacks was the air transport system, their eﬀect on New
York’s, and, to a lesser extent, Washington’s, public transit systems was dramatic
and long-lasting and profoundly tested the ability of transit staﬀ in these two
cities to respond to a major crisis. Finally, as the seat of the national government,
most federal transit and transportation security oﬃcials are in the Washington,
D.C. area.
Where appropriate, the ﬁndings from these interviews are supplemented with the
results of a 2004 nationwide survey of all 259 U.S. transit agencies that (according
to the National Transit Database maintained by the Federal Transit Administration) operate at least 50 vehicles in peak period service. The letter to each general
manager asked her/him to designate the appropriate person or persons to complete an on-line survey. All told, respondents from 113 transit agencies completed
survey questions, for a 44 percent response rate.1 This survey follows two earlier
surveys of transit operators: 1) a survey of 42 transit managers that took place several years before September 11th (Boyd and Sullivan 1997) and 2) a United States
General Accounting Oﬃce (GAO) study conducted soon after September 11th
that included a survey in 2002 of oﬃcials at 155 U.S. transit agencies (2002). This
latter survey-based report considered the roles the federal government should
play in helping public transit operators reduce both the likelihood and impacts of
terrorist attacks on U.S. transit systems.

4
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Findings
Despite nearly four years of relative quiet, most transit agency security staff remain extremely concerned about the possibility of transit
terrorism on their systems.
Chief John O’Connor of the Amtrak Police Department at Penn Station believes
that the threat of terrorism on transit systems is “very real and that it is a question
of when rather than if.” For O’Connor, September 11th was a galvanizing force,
but it had started to fade somewhat in the mind’s eye of the public. The events in
Madrid in March 2004, however, brought the issue of transportation security back
to the forefront and, according to O’Connor, “now for most transit agencies it’s
one of their top priorities, if not the top.” Oﬃcials are especially concerned about
the negative publicity transit has received as a high-proﬁle terrorist target after the
recent attacks in Moscow, Madrid, and London. Attention is increasingly focused
on rail systems and major stations, such as Penn Station and Grand Central Station. These large multimodal facilities and landmarks are considered potential
targets of particular concern.
Indeed, respondents to our nationwide survey believed heavy (80%), commuter
(63%), and light rail (60%) to be “very vulnerable” to future attack, while less that
half believed bus service (45%), paratransit service (26%), and ferry service (22%)
to be very vulnerable. With respect to transit system components, tracks and lines
(66%) and stations (63%) were most likely to be identiﬁed as “very vulnerable.”
Greg Hull is Director of Operations, Safety, and Security Programs for the American Public Transportation Association (APTA), a transit industry organization
with a membership of over 1,500 transit agencies and business representatives
from across the U.S. In terms of understanding the transit terrorism threat at the
local level, he acknowledges that perspectives on the level of risk and threat vary
widely. However, he argues that the threat is pervasive regardless of whether the
transit system is located in a large metropolitan area or a small one:
Some of us might argue that it doesn’t matter where you are. I mean, look at
Oklahoma City. This isn’t just Al Queda we’re dealing with. There are domestic
terrorists, there are people who have political missions, there are people who
are wackos, there are people who are copycats, and so it doesn’t matter, from
my perspective, it doesn’t matter where you are located, whether in Pocatello,
Idaho, or Washington, D.C…. It doesn’t matter what city you live in or what
town you live in, there is a need to address these issues.
5
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Hull also asserts that agencies need to address requirements in all modes–from
subways to buses–contending that transit terrorism is not conﬁned to the largest
population centers. However, he acknowledges that, practically and realistically,
when making decisions about security using a risk management approach, local
agencies do consider large numbers of people to pose the greatest vulnerabilities.
Increased intra-agency coordination is important in transit security
planning and interagency coordination at the national and international levels is crucial.
Several interviewees noted the importance of having management, planning, and
operations personnel work hand-in-hand with police and security staﬀ to both
minimize security-related service disruptions and to avoid having such disruptions
become safety hazards in their own right. Said one interviewee,
As the security people come up with ideas that may not ﬁt, if you have operating people sitting there, that’s better. We have to reach some sort of a balance,
some sort of a medium. How do we stop trains, how do we do inspections, but
weave it into the regular fabric of our operations so our customers hardly notice?
If we have a suspicious package, what is the procedure to deal with it? We try to
minimize the delay to the train while still answering the concern, because when
you start delaying trains, you create another safety problem as more trains get
backed up. Now you’re creating a service disruption. In Penn Station or Grand
Central, many of the subway stations where they have such volumes, just delaying a train or two, you can lose a station. We end up having to shut down things.
And then you get thousands and thousands of people in a panic situation wondering, “What’s going on? Why am I being evacuated?” Once you can’t run trains,
you can’t let people into the station because you have a crush load.
FTA’s assistance to local transit agencies is aimed at trying to standardize practices
and provide support such that the agencies are prepared and can share information among themselves. The goal is to identify best practices and their dissemination to other agencies in similar circumstances. A high level of interagency cooperation already has been established in some places; transit security oﬃcials in
New York describe a signiﬁcant amount of coordination not just in the New York
area, but in the Northeast corridor more generally. O’Connor of Amtrak says that
his agency deals with the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA)
in Boston, the Connecticut Department of Transportation, the Long Island Railroad, New Jersey Transit, the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Agency
6
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(SEPTA), and the Maryland Rail Commuter (MARC). Some of these agencies have
their own police departments, while others do not; some agencies provide security
services for other transit systems. In a place such as Penn Station, there is a multijurisdictional structure where the station is owned by Amtrak, which patrols the
majority of the facility. Long Island Railroad leases a portion of the station and the
New York MTA police patrol the lower level. Finally, the street level and subway
entrances are policed by the New York Police Department (NYPD). Coordination
among these policing and transit agencies becomes imperative.
Hull also emphasized that agency coordination and the dissemination of information are crucial. Very few people in the transit industry, even among the police
forces, have security clearances. According to Hull, after September 11th, APTA
realized that the transit industry and federal transportation agencies needed to
access security intelligence information. Transit agencies in major cities had good
working relationships with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) through
established joint terrorism task forces. However, this was not the case across the
board. The U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) designated APTA a sector
coordinator for the establishment of a Public Transit Information Sharing Analysis
Center (PT-ISAC), part of the larger umbrella Surface Transportation ISAC. In this
role, APTA has served as the primary contact for organizing public transportation
agencies around security issues. APTA worked on this PT-ISAC project through an
FTA grant. Hull says that APTA used the grant to contract with a company based
in Virginia:
They have on staﬀ those people who have backgrounds, past careers with the FBI
and Department of Defense. They have top-level security clearances. And they
are able to glean through sources of information and package it in a manner
that’s meaningful to the transit industry. We are now in the process of connecting all transit agencies within this ISAC to be able to access this information.
Hull related that the ﬂow of information is from the ISAC out to transit agencies,
but there is also a push to have agencies input their own information into the
intelligence system: “If an agency experiences a certain degree of trespassing, they
might see that as kids getting into the train yards or something. But maybe it’s
part of something that’s more of a trend in the industry and that becomes good
information that needs to be analyzed and disseminated out to the industry.”
Hull says the direct exchange of information among agencies is also a priority for
APTA and something it helps facilitate:
7
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We get the permission of the transit agencies to share whatever the best practice might be. It might be something like preventive maintenance, it might be a
design concept in a facility, it might be the way that staﬀ are utilized for safety
and security. Our industry has historically and continues to be very supportive
of one another. One of the things that has occurred is that where prior to 9/11
we saw more agencies more willing to share their security plans, now that’s a
little more closely guarded. They may share those plans with one another, but it
would be eye-to-eye and hand-to-hand as opposed to what we may have seen
in prior years. But there’s a very, very open sharing of information within the
system.
In addition, APTA has actively engaged individuals in various federal agencies
working on security issues, particularly DHS and TSA, in order to educate them
about public transit. According to Hull, APTA has used a Transit 101 presentation
with the message that the organization—not the federal government—has the
real expertise in transit. APTA involves the transit industry in all important stages
of planning:
They [the federal government] may have the expertise in terms of security
development for certain perspectives and certainly they have the funds and
the legislative mandate. But the bottom line is that if there are any directions
or mandates to the transit industry.… the only way that those things can be
successful is by engaging us at a very early stage so that the industry can have
proper buy-in and actually have a hand in the development of any such standards that might come forward.
Hull understands that transit security is happening in an international context.
As such, the organization has formal partnerships with other transit industry
groups around the world: the Canadian Urban Transit Association, the International Association of Public Transport (UITP, with headquarters in Brussels), the
Latin-American Association of Underground Networks and Subways (ALAMYS),
and the Cooperation for the Continuing Development of Urban and Suburban
Transportation (CODATU), based in Paris and representing transit systems in
developing nations. A couple of years ago, APTA invited these associations and
some of their primary agency members to meet with them in Washington. The
goal was to share information about program development and relationships
with government agencies. APTA representatives continue to share information
with these other groups and they invite each other to special conferences and
workshops on security.
8
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Balancing the security of their systems with other operations and
management objectives is a central dilemma for many transit managers.
Particular security strategies, like inspecting passenger bags or employing explosives detection technologies, pose enormous challengers to transit systems
that depend on operating as quickly and reliably as possible. Some oﬃcials, like
Amtrak’s O’Connor, are sanguine that improved security and eﬃcient operations can be eﬀectively integrated to bolster ridership: “If people do not feel safe
and secure, they won’t use the system. They’ll avoid it if possible. If you allow the
system to fall into disorder and decay, it will deﬁnitely aﬀect your ridership.” Thus,
operators are aware that weighing the costs and beneﬁts of system security overall,
as well as of particular measures, is a complex process and includes variables that
can be diﬃcult to quantify. An overwhelming majority (87%) of the respondents
to our nationwide survey of transit operators reported that anti-terrorism eﬀorts
were either fully (46%) or partially (41%) congruent with anti-crime eﬀorts.
Amtrak’s O’Connor believes that all security strategies are important, and the
distinction is between short term and longer term strategies:
On a day to day basis, your focus is on operations, police deployment, both prevention and response. Long term, you need to set goals and design activities to
help achieve those goals. You need to plan long term capital improvement that
will help you achieve those goals. And you have to constantly—daily, weekly,
quarterly, yearly—measure the eﬀectiveness of your strategies and tactics to see
if they are in fact achieving those goals.
Threat and vulnerability assessments are one important tool to help security
officials weigh their different options, and, in fact, 80 percent of our survey
respondents reported that they conducted the most recent threat and vulnerability assessment at their agencies to identify eﬀective security technology and
procedures. These assessments are also quite common. Eighty-ﬁve percent of the
113 agencies surveyed nationwide indicated that they have conducted some level
of threat and vulnerability assessment; agencies with rail were much more likely
to conduct a comprehensive assessment than other agencies. This is a signiﬁcant
increase over the 54 percent reported by respondents to the 2002 GAO survey
(United States General Accounting Oﬃce 2002).
Survey respondents were asked to describe other ways their agencies have
attempted to identify and assess security vulnerabilities in the transit system.
9
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Methods identiﬁed most frequently were constant monitoring of crime statistics,
periodic reviews/discussions of security by employees, daily visual checks/observations, employee and customer feedback, and regular contact with local law
enforcement agencies. Many agencies reported having an internal security committee that meets on a regular basis to discuss and monitor security. One agency
reported an active Transit Watch program, which solicits the participation of
customers to point out vulnerabilities.
The perceived relevance of environmental design as a security strategy increased signiﬁcantly after September 11th.
All of the transit oﬃcials interviewed for this research believe that design elements are central to security planning and should be explicitly addressed during the design and construction of facilities. Said one interviewee, “We’ve now
incorporated security in the designs and boilerplates. Whereas at one time if you
were going to construct a station, you would have only had to do safety—ﬁre
suppression, ﬁre and life safety, ventilation, lighting, ﬁre alarms. But now there’s a
security piece that gets incorporated.” Several of those interviewed suggested that,
by including security as an integral part of the design process, transit agencies can
avoid costly and sometimes problematic station retroﬁts and redesigns.
The oﬃcials interviewed reported implementing other, less expensive environmental design strategies since September 11th, including removing trash cans,
locking down seats in rail cars, taking out recessed telephones, eliminating nooks
and crannies at stops and in stations, and installing access controls on all doors.
Such strategies—both elaborate and simple—often are grouped under the rubric
of “crime prevention through environmental design,” or CPTED. Among the 113
respondents to our nationwide survey of large and medium-sized transit operators, 58 percent reported that their agency now makes moderate or extensive use
of CPTED strategies. About half (49%) of bus-only agencies reported using CPTED
strategies; among transit agencies operating one or more rail modes, which are
far more likely to include enclosed stations, the ﬁgure was closer to 9 out of 10
(88%).
While extensive design retroﬁts for existing stations would be costly, certain
design schemes means can be utilized to enhance security. Amtrak’s O’Connor
says that, after September 11th, his agency took several steps to put environmental design features into place. At the major stations, barricades and CCTV systems
were installed without making major renovations to any of the stations. O’Connor
pointed to the Washington, D.C. Metro system as one of the best in terms of
10

Inter-Governmental Transit Security Planning in the U.S.

security-oriented environmental design, with its clear sight lines and relatively
few nooks and crannies. With respect to the future, O’Connor suggests that intercity transportation agencies will have to consider creating “secure zones,” where
people are screened and their bags checked before they enter boarding areas. He
acknowledges, however, that this type of system is diﬃcult to implement in intracity transit environments where very large numbers of people make relatively
short trips.
Most transit ofﬁcials believe that passenger outreach and awareness
strategies are important.
Many transit systems internationally—such as the Underground subway system
in London—have actively sought to enlist the help of patrons in watching for and
reporting suspicious activity. William Morange, Executive Director for Security
at the New York MTA, believes that rider and employee awareness is the most
eﬀective transit security strategy. He notes that the Executive Director of New
York MTA put an “if you see something, say something” program in place before
September 11th, “where if you see something that’s not kosher—the way it should
look—report it to the conductors, report it to the motormen. . . Now calls are
going up, but it’s worth it for us.”
APTA’s Hull says that there are “tools that enhance security and we certainly
see more of the transit agencies moving towards introducing a variety of technologies,” but he emphasizes two particular security strategies: (1) training and (2)
emergency preparedness drills. The former includes the formal training of transit
staﬀ, but also outreach to transit customers—“the whole concept of having a
broad network of eyes and ears and voices that will look for and let us know when
they see something that just doesn’t seem right.”
When asked about information and outreach strategies to educate transit riders
about general emergency and safety issues, three-quarters of those surveyed from
rail systems report having such programs in place, and 90 percent of these include
speciﬁc strategies to educate transit riders about dealing with terrorist attacks.
In addition, while fewer than 30 percent of respondents to our national survey
of transit operators perceived public education and user outreach as “central”
or “signiﬁcant” to increasing transit security prior to September 11th, this ﬁgure
jumped to over 60 percent after September 11th.
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Conclusions
In this paper we have examined, through both in-depth interviews and responses
to a national survey, eﬀorts of federal agencies and national organizations in the
U.S. and transit operators (primarily in the large cities of the northeastern U.S.)
to maintain and enhance the security of local rail transit system design and environments. Our ﬁndings show that transit security has emerged as a signiﬁcant
concern for transit operators, especially after recent terrorist attacks on systems
in Madrid, Moscow, and London. Although policing and security hardware and
technology continue to be primary security strategies, the incorporation of environmental design and public education and user outreach programs has increased
substantially since September 11th. Agencies continue to struggle with the conundrum central to transit security planning—eﬀectively securing their systems
while keeping the system running eﬃciently. In this regard, transit operators are
constantly assessing their security options and understanding the ways in which
system security can help or hinder ridership.
One of the important developments in transit security is the amount of cooperation that appears to be occurring among federal, national, and local agencies.
Federal interviewees were unanimous in their view that relatively little in the way
of “turf battles” was occurring as agencies juggle their evolving and, in some cases,
newly acquired roles and responsibilities. The contributions of non-governmental
industry organizations, particularly APTA, deserve special mention in this regard.
APTA has assisted each of the organizations mentioned in this paper in a variety
of ways, including cooperation in the development of the PT-ISAC, which facilitates the sharing of security-related information among transit and government
agencies. APTA and transit operators in the U.S. also seem eager to foster these
relationships both in the domestic and international contexts. As to the ultimate
eﬀectiveness of these many eﬀorts to increase transit system security, only time
will tell.

12
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Appendix—List of Interviews
Hull, Greg. Interview by Camille Fink. American Public Transportation Association,
Washington, D.C., 14 January 2004.
Morange, William. Interview by Ellen Cavanagh. Metropolitan Transportation
Authority, New York, NY, 4 June 2004.
O’Connor, John. Interview by Ellen Cavanagh. Amtrak Police Department, Penn
Station, New York, NY, 1 June 2004.
The interviews of security oﬃcials at two other transit agencies informed the ﬁndings reported here, but the identities of the people interviewed, their organizations, and any agency-speciﬁc information from these interviews are not reported
here to honor their requests for anonymity.

End Notes
Both the interview and survey data are drawn from a larger transit security study
entitled “Designing and Operating Safe and Secure Transit Systems: Assessing Current Practices in the U.S. and Abroad” undertaken by the paper’s authors and a
group of other researchers at UCLA, UC Berkeley, and San Jose State University.
1
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Abstract
Ferries, the safest form of transportation in North America and Europe, can be the
agents of catastrophe in some developing nations. Over the past decades there have
been numerous incidents in which hundreds have died. The international ferry community, under the leadership of Interferry and the Worldwide Ferry Safety Association,
working with IMO support, has embarked on a comprehensive 10-year plan to reduce
ferry fatalities by 90 percent. This article describes the ﬁrst research task needed to
achieve the ferry safety goal of devising a framework to determine the responsible
parties for ferry safety across the full social fabric, including ferry owners, local and
national ferry authorities, national trade associations and international business and
regulatory associations. This framework is intended to inform and be used as a guide
to mobilize the relevant sectors of society to achieve reduction in ferry fatalities.

Introduction
Ferries, the safest form of transportation in North America and Europe, can be
the agents of catastrophe in some developing nations. Over the past decades
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there have been numerous incidents in which hundreds have died. Even in the
ﬁrst few years of the 21st century there have been, on average, over 1,000 fatalities
per year. In most of the nations with the poorest safety records (e.g., Bangladesh
and Somalia), ferry travel is not discretionary. Travel is not primarily for recreation
but is virtually the only way to pursue work and maintain social connections. The
economic development of these nations is stymied by the lack of reliable mobility. In addition, the loss of life and the human tragedy disproportionately impacts
those in their prime.
The international ferry community, under the leadership of Interferry, working
with International Maritime Organization (IMO) support, has embarked on a
comprehensive 10-year plan to reduce ferry fatalities by 90 percent. This article
describes the ﬁrst research task needed to achieve the ferry safety goal of devising
a framework to determine the parties responsible for ferry safety across the full
social fabric, including ferry owners, local and national ferry authorities, national
trade associations, and international business and regulatory associations. This
framework is intended to inform and be used as a guide to mobilize the relevant
sectors of society to achieve reduction in ferry fatalities.

Background
Over the past several decades, the number and frequency of large-scale fatalities
from ferry incidents in emerging nations have been appalling. This trend has continued to the present time, with over 4,000 people reported to have died in ferry
accidents between January 2000 and May 2004 alone. (Note that the fatality statistics are based on bodies recovered; very often there are a larger number of persons listed as “missing.” In addition, precise documentation is not always possible
because the actual number of passengers is frequently unknown. See Table 1).

Context of Ferry Fatalities
Compared to other modes within Bangladesh, the rate of ferry fatalities is comparable to road transport fatalities. Four thousand people die annually in road accidents.1 Compared to the developed world—for example, the United States—road
fatalities in Bangladesh have a high convergence; in the United States there are
close to 40,000 fatalities annually—10-fold the number of fatalities in Bangladesh,
a nation with about 45 percent of the U.S. population. (The diﬀerential reﬂects the
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Table 1. New Millennia Ferry Fatalities (Documented)

very low rate of vehicle ownership, counterbalanced by the high rate of incidence
of road fatalities and the high rate of fatalities to casualties.2)
When the number of ferry fatalities is compared to road fatalities in the developed
world, the issue of ferry fatalities is stark. In the developed world, the number and
incidence of road fatalities are high, whereas ferry fatalities are virtually nil. For
example, the U.S. ferry system transports 200 million passengers annually (http://
www.oduport.org/Ferry.htm); the Bangladesh system transports approximately 40
million (http://nation.ittefaq.com/artman/exec/view.cgi/18/10609). In Bangladesh,
there were over 1,000 fatalities annually; in the United States, there were virtually no fatalities between 1904 (the General Slocum ferry incident) and 2003 (the
Staten Island ferry incident).

Why Study and Seek to Address Ferry Fatalities?
Although for Bangladesh the ferry and road transport accident statistics are
roughly comparable, ferry transport is important because, relatively, ferry systems
are more environmentally sustainable and require far lower capital investment for
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expansion and improvement and they have multiple values for economic development.
In general, ferry transport is often a critical element of economic development for
many nations because of their fundamental reliance on ferries for the transport
of people and goods—hence the critical importance of ferries to jobs and trade
as a catalyst of economic growth (Weisbrod and Lawson 2003a). In many of the
nations where the high fatality incidents occur, ferry transport is essential to the
lives of the local populations. Geographic features, both physical and political,
precondition the need for ferry transport for nations with island archipelagos,
unbridgeable straits, riverine deltas, poor road transport, or a combination of
these geographic features. With transportation the basis of economic development and ferry systems the major component of transportation systems, the lack
of safety is economically devastating.
Creating a safe and reliable ferry system is also crucial to these nations’ sustainable
future. Ferries for transport of people and goods, notwithstanding the fact that
they produce emissions, have a lower environmental impact than other forms
of transportation. In terms of planning for the future, the highly developed and
urbanized world has concluded that more waterborne transport of people and
freight is sustainable, with both the European Union and the United States actively
encouraging its use, particularly for freight.
The problem of ferry safety in the developing world will not go away on its own.
The mindless loss of human life must be curbed—and can be. The international
maritime and ferry communities stand ready to oﬀer their assistance and capacity-building know-how. Foremost in this endeavor is the international ferry organization, Interferry.
Interferry is a trade association representing the worldwide ferry industry. Its participation is key to solving the ferry safety catastrophe in developing nations. In
existence for almost 30 years, the organization has over 160 member companies
from 22 countries and is actively engaged in expansion. Interferry participates with
nongovernmental organization (NGO) status in IMO activities and is a member of
the Maritime Safety Committee. As such, Interferry can reach out to developing
nations on a collegial basis. Trade associations can be an eﬀective vehicle for positive change, for both the industry and for government, as our research on the role
of the transportation trade associations in homeland security has demonstrated
(Weisbrod and Lawson 2003b).
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Members of Interferry formed a nonproﬁt organization, the Worldwide Ferry
Safety Association (WFSA), a registered 501C3. The organization is led by a board
of directors, which includes the CEO of Interferry, Len Roueche, and one of the
authors of this paper, Roberta Weisbrod. An advisory board is in formation.
Interferry/WFSA and IMO have initiated a 10-year plan with the goal of reducing
fatalities by 90 percent. The ﬁrst steps are: (1) identiﬁcation of the nature of the
safety problem in ferry transport through root cause analysis; (2) comprehending
responsibility for ferry safety, in order to know with whom to work and how to
work with them; and (3) creation and analysis of a deﬁnitive 25-year database for
ferry fatalities, in order to know what major factors are precipitating and contributing to fatalities, so that a practical and eﬀective approach may be devised. A
pilot project will be planned by a Bangladesh-based ferry safety working group in
late 2005–early 2006.

A Framework for Determining Responsibility
Essential to the success of the endeavor is the development of a framework
capable of examining how responsibility is distributed and how it can be leveraged. One of the most famous ferry tragedies was the General Slocum (in which
over 1,000 people died on a sunny day in sight of land in New York City, in 1904)
(O’Donnell 2003). Previous work used the sinking of the General Slocum as a platform for understanding the realm of responsibility (Weisbrod et al. 2005). Based
on that analysis, questions to be asked include not only what entities control
creation of policy, establishment of regulations, application of technology, inspections, enforcement of regulations, training, training standards, search and rescue,
and reporting and analysis of incidents, but also what other entities, such as the
press, citizens groups and local governments without statutory authority, can raise
the standards and how can the governmental and nongovernmental sectors create the feedback loop on continuous improvement? These questions illustrate the
complex reality of controlling ferry safety.
The review of the incident in Bangladesh in 2004 is used to develop a model to
determine what entities in the public, private and nongovernmental sectors are
responsible for which aspects of ferry safety and how they do and do not exercise
their responsibility. Other recent and highly documented ferry casualties include
the capsizing of the Baltimore water taxi in 2004 (Brumﬁeld 2004); the Staten
Island ferry collision of 2003 (Weisbrod and Lawson 2004); the sinking of the vehi21
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cle passenger (Ro-Pax) ferry Estonia in 1994 (Langewiesche 2004); and the capsize
after debarkation of the Ro-Pax Herald of Free Enterprise in 1987 (Crainer 1993).

Bangladesh: Exploring the Realm of Responsibility
Role of Ferries
Bangladesh is a nation of over 130 million people living on a coastal river delta,
interspersed with 250 north-south rivers. Ferries, of which there are purported
to be 20,000, are a major mode of transport for most of the population (Reuters
2004). The ferry ﬂeet is divided into two distinct types of services and vessel types:
(1) ferries used for river crossings that are designed to carry cars and trucks, under
the control of the Inland River Authority; these ferries rarely become involved in
accidents, and (2) ferries that travel longer distances, leaving from Dhaka to travel
to the islands and delta communities, which are more likely to be involved in
catastrophic accidents.
Record of Ferry Accidents
In Bangladesh, every year there are many ferry accidents in which hundreds of
people die. According to our records, between April 2003 (Lawson 2003) and July
2003 (BBC News 2003a) alone, over 1,200 people died in six separate incidents.
Tracking the number of fatalities is diﬃcult because the number of passengers is
usually not known and multiple accidents occur at similar times and places. At
the time of a recent ferry disaster in May 2004, when over 150 people died (Lloyd’s
List 2004), oﬃcials from the Inland Water Transport Authority said that over 1,000
people die in ferry accidents each year and more are counted missing (Reuters
2004). Accident reporting is unreliable at present and makes meaningful analysis
diﬃcult.
Disaster Factors
The precipitating factors tend to be weather-related. The storms of May and June
are most virulent. The Ministry of Shipping addressed this issue by forbidding ferries from going out during the hours of 3:00 and 8:00 PM during the monsoon, a
ban that was subsequently rescinded when ferry operators protested (BBC News
2003b).
One major contributing factor seems to be massive overcrowding. The number
of passengers is never known, but the overcrowding is surmised from the number
of fatalities and survivors. The Minister of Shipping has stated that “ultimately, it
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was up to passengers to decide not to board ferries that are too crowded” (Lawson
2003). Related to the overcrowding issue is the governmental mandate to cap fares.
If ferry operators are unable to raise revenues by increasing fares, they are likely to
increase revenues simply by allowing many more passengers on the vessel.
Stowage of cargo on the deck is another factor, creating top-heavy imbalance and
contributing to capsizing, especially in rough weather. Substandard vessels are
also a signiﬁcant contributing factor; some have been purchased after long-term
use elsewhere. Oﬃcials from the Inland Water Transport Authority said that over
20,000 vessels are in service, but only 8,000 are registered and, of those, only about
20 percent were certiﬁed as ﬁt to operate (Reuters 2004).

Structure of Responsibility
The portfolio of the Minister of Shipping, one of 24 cabinet ministers, includes
design of vessels as well as enforcement of laws and regulations pertaining to
shipping. The minister has stated for the record that passengers have a responsibility not to board overcrowded vessels; during April 2003 the ministry ran public
service announcements not to travel on overcrowded vessels during the stormy
season which begins in April/May (BBC News 2003b).
The Inland Water Transport Authority, established in 1958, develops and regulates the inland water network. With respect to inland development, the agency
undertakes planning and dredging projects. Its regulatory role is limited to the
commercial aspects—overseeing ferry fares and timetables. Although the Inland
Water Transport Authority apparently has no regulatory authority on ferry safety,
it does seem to be documenting incidents.
Public and Private Sector Operators
Of the more than 20,000 ferries in Bangladesh, 3,000 are state-owned and more
than 4,000 are privately-owned. Some of this uncertainty in numbers of ferries
can be explained by the fact that only 8,000 ferries actually are registered (Reuters
2004).
Labor
The relevant labor federations include the Noujan [river vessels] Workers’ Federation, which operates on 4,000 private river ferries. In 2002 the workers went on a
strike over safety—but their issue was piracy, not operational safety (Worldwide
Socialist News 2002).
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Ferryboat Operators
Ferryboat operators exercised their right of protest in April 2003 to overturn a
government-imposed ban on night travel (BBC News 2003b). The Ministry of Shipping had instituted a ban on travel between 3 and 8 PM during monsoon season
in early 2003 and rescinded the ban when “ferry owners promised not to operate
their vessels in inclement weather and to follow safety regulations” (Sydney Morning Herald 2003). Note that the protest and its results were reported in July 2003 in
an article headlined “600 feared dead in a night voyage during monsoon season,”
which the ban was intended to avoid and the ferry owners’ promises would have
prevented.
Local Government
To date, the local government has not played a role.
International Organizations
The IMO, a United Nations agency, is concerned with safety for international
shipping and the prevention of marine pollution. The agency is responsible for
adopting rules for international maritime issues, which the 164 member nations
implement. Ferries that are in domestic trade only are not considered part of its
portfolio. However, the current leadership, as well as the previous one, is committed (as are members) to addressing the issue of ferry safety. As Efthimios Mitropooulos, the secretary-general has said (Maritime News 2004):
It is essential that we ﬁnd way of addressing the question of safety standards
aboard non-convention ships [i.e., ships that are not subject to IMO regulations]. The tragic ferry accidents in the Philippines and the Maldives this year
have highlighted how devastating these incidents can be in terms of loss of life.
IMO has already promoted the development, adoption and implementation
of safety codes for non-convention vessels in Asia and the Paciﬁc, Africa, the
Caribbean and the Mediterranean and will continue to explore initiatives to
assist countries in avoiding these tragedies in the future.
Bangladesh is a member of the IMO and also a member of the Maritime Safety
Committee (MSC). A Bangladesh citizen, Captain Moin Uddin Ahmed, is the head
of the Asia Paciﬁc Section of the Technical Cooperation Division of the IMO (L.
Roueche, personal communication 2005).
Table 2 highlights the important aspects of ferry accident prevention, including
the role and eﬀectiveness of regulation, vessel design and operations and the initial
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response. Table 3 addresses postevent issues: investigation, documentation of the
accident, sanctions, insurance, and victim support.

Table 2. Prevention and Response for Ferry Safety in Developing Countries
Function
Prevention
Regulatory Approach

Issues/Area of Inquiry
Are the regulations adequate to the conditions?
How does the rule making take place?
How are rules communicated?
How are regulations enforced?
Is there any oversight in the implementation of the regulations?

Vessel Design

Are vessels designed properly for their purpose?
What proportion of the ﬂeet of vessels is certiﬁed?
Are there penalties/obstacles for certiﬁcation?
Are these noncertiﬁed vessels long-after, after-market vessels?
Are there penalties for noncertiﬁcation?
Is there a diﬀerence with respect to accident rates for long-after,
after-market vessels?
What and how rigorous is the certiﬁcation process?
What is the relationship between ferry fatalities and vessel certiﬁcation?
Are the vessels inappropriate or inadequately maintained and/or
improperly operated?

Operational Standard

What is the accident record diﬀerential between certiﬁed/noncertiﬁed vessels with respect to operating standards?
What is the accident record diﬀerential between vessels that are
publicly or privately owned?
Are there diﬀerences with respect to routes and type of service
between public and private operations?
How can registration/certiﬁcation be encouraged by the industry,
local government, or citizens groups?

Response

What type of training and drills are available for private or public
crews?
Is there a relationship between the record of training and drills and
ferry fatalities?
Is there a formal system in place for search and rescues?
Have “safe havens” been identiﬁed in event of major storm and/or
vessel damage?
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Table 3. Post-Event Responsibilities for Ferry Safety
in Developing Countries
Function

Issues/Area of Inquiry

Investigation

What agency investigates ferry accidents?
How are involved parties informed of results?
Are accident investigation reports disseminated in a timely and
well-publicized fashion so that operators and regulators can
learn from them?

Documentation of
accidents

Where, who, how and what if there isn’t any?
Is there an active press to track and continually publicize incidents
and the role of government and industry in implementing safe
conditions on ferries?

Sanctions

What is the record of sanctions to those who violate the safety
rules?
Consider that the innate sanction of loss of asset for owners is not a
feedback mechanism because the vessel is already depreciated.
What would be eﬀective?

Insurance

Do vessels need to have insurance to operate legally? Is insurance
available? Are liability coverage provisions enforced?

Victim support

Are victims given compensation, through an insurance system,
which would have the eﬀect of discouraging reckless behavior?

Effecting Positive Change
One approach to establishing a positive model for ferry safety is to tie international aid for the purposes of vessel purchase to improved operational oversight.
The Danish aid organization Danida has had a history of assisting the ferry sector
of Bangladesh, working with the national government and coordinating its activities with the World Bank (Underenrigmisteriet undated). Since 1981, Danida has
assisted the ferry sector by delivering several ferries, ﬁnancing local construction
of ferries (with main components from Denmark), and helping to construct and
rehabilitate docks. Technical assistance and training have been part of the package.
In 2002, Danida announced that relations with the Shipping Ministry were such
that cooperation was not possible and rescinded its commitment for renovation
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of ferries for the locality of Aricha (a port on the Ganges) and related activities.
Danida is assisting the roads and highways department of the Communications
Ministry in the construction of ferries and landing pontoons by a privately-owned
Bangladeshi shipyard (Bangladesh Observer 2004).
Nations also can oﬀer assistance by providing a framework of lifesaving standards
for ferries. The U.S. Coast Guard Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC)
1-97 for Shipboard Safety Management and Contingency Planning for Passenger
Vessels (www.uscg.mil/hq/nvic/1-97/n1-97.htm) is suﬃciently ﬂexible to be adaptable by ferry operators in a wide variety of circumstances of geography and use.
The NVIC follows a “keep it simple” philosophy that makes it especially useful.
Although not proactive with respect to preventing accidents, the International
Red Cross assists with rescue eﬀorts and provides trauma counseling to survivors
and the bereaved (BBC News 2003b).
After the issues presented in Tables 2 and 3 are examined, there is still a question
of how best to promote a vector of change. The goal of reducing ferry fatalities by
90 percent over 10 years will not be accomplished with data collection and rootcause analysis alone. A well-funded program of projects developed on the basis of
analysis is needed to determine what will make a diﬀerence. What steps, organizations, and/or stakeholders can be brought to bear?
Like Bangladesh’s successful program for infant mortality reduction, this project
will have to go beyond traditional central government activities (World Bank
2003). It will need full, active engagement of multiple sectors of society, including
the press, local government, labor, trade associations and the international community. State or provincial government can help solve problems by demonstrating innovative solutions. Local government, through its control of land use for
ferry landings, can control the industry.
Trade associations oﬀer a unique opportunity to eﬀect change. An investigation
into the role of the transportation trade associations in homeland security revealed
that roughly half the associations representing liquid bulk carriers prepared model
security plans, coordinated with agency guidance, for their member companies. A
beneﬁt for the companies was agency endorsement of the plans, customer appreciation, and a greater ease of implementation (Weisbrod and Lawson 2003b).
Employees can be at the front line in pushing for safety. Workers’ lives are at stake;
they understand the issues from daily exposure to unsafe conditions. Unions could
be an untapped resource for safety issues. It may depend on the structure of the
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labor federations and unions. Are their members working for both the private and
public companies? Are the unions capable of protecting their members and, if so,
can they be successfully integrated into eﬀecting change?
A ﬁnal opportunity may be the rapid adoption of communication technologies,
such as cell phones and other wireless devices. As developing nations expand
their use of wireless technologies, citizens will be able to report unsafe situations
(Arnold 2001). These communications could make enforcement easier and also
serve as receivers for weather information or other news that could inﬂuence the
safety of ferry sailings.

Concluding Remarks
Reaching the goal of reducing ferry accidents in developing countries by 90 percent
in 10 years will take a serious eﬀort by all parties. By systematically examining the
evidence and establishing and allocating responsibilities, the partners in ferry safety
can make progress on a number of fronts. Concentrating on Bangladesh has immediate beneﬁts. If current eﬀorts produce successful experiences, lessons learned can
provide transferable strategies for other countries with similar challenges. What can
we do to reduce ferry fatalities? What will be the driver for change in the developing nations? What sectors of society can be mobilized to work with governmental
leadership and how can they best exert their locus of responsibility?

End Notes
In terms of incidence of fatalities, road transport accounts for approximately
four times the number of ferry fatalities. Road transport, however, accounts for
72 percent of the 73 billion passenger kilometers (km) traveled, while ferry transport accounts for 14 percent (http://www.adb.org/Documents/TARs/BAN/R18300.pdf). By that measure, road transport, at ﬁvefold the passenger km traveled but
with fourfold the fatalities, has a somewhat lower incidence rate.
1

In 2000, there were 550,000 motorized vehicles in Bangladesh (http://w3.whosea.
org/EN/Section1243/Section1310/Section1343/Section1344/Section1836/Section1837_8165.htm), compared to 213 million in the United States. The incidence
rate is between 70 and 160 per 10,000 vehicles versus 2 in the United States. Also,
an additional 6,000 casualties required hospitalization; in the United States, for
every fatality there are 13 casualties requiring hospitalization, reﬂecting diﬀerences in the emergency medical care.
2
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Terrorism, Transit and
Public Safety:
Evaluating the Risks
Todd Litman, Victoria Transport Policy Institute Victoria, BC, CANADA

Abstract
This paper evaluates the overall safety of public transit, taking into account all risks,
including recent terrorist attacks. It indicates that transit is an extremely safe mode,
with total per-passenger-mile fatality rates approximately one-tenth that of automobile travel. It is important for individuals and public oﬃcials to avoid overreacting to
terrorist threats in ways that increase overall danger. Transit terrorism would cause
more total casualties and harm to society if individuals respond to attacks by shifting from public transit to less safe modes, or if decision makers respond by reducing
support for public transit.
“The only thing we have to fear is fear itself—nameless, unreasoning,
unjustiﬁed terror which paralyzes needed eﬀorts to convert retreat into
advance.”
—Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1932 Presidential Inaugural Address
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On July 7, 2005, terrorist bombs on London’s transit system killed approximately
50 people and injured hundreds. This is not the ﬁrst terrorist attack on public transit. In 1995, a religious group released sarin gas in Tokyo’s subway system, killing 12
and making thousands of people sick. In recent years, bombs exploded on buses
and trains in Israel, Madrid, Moscow, Paris and other cities.
Despite such events, public transit is still an extremely safe form of travel. The trafﬁc fatality rate per passenger-kilometer is less than one-tenth that of automobile
travel, as indicated in ﬁgures 1 through 3 (the analysis for these graph is in the
Transit Risk spreadsheet, available from the Victoria Transport Policy Institute
website at www.vtpi.org/transitrisk.xls). Even including terrorist attacks and other
crimes against transit passengers, transit is far safer than private vehicle travel.

Figure 1. U.K. Death Rate by Mode

Source: (Steer Davies Gleave, 2005, Table 7.3)
Note: UK transit passengers have about one-twentieth the traﬃc fatality rate as
automobile occupants.
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Figure 2. U.S. Death Rate by Mode

Source: (BTS, Tables 2-1 and 2-4; APTA, 2003)
Note: U.S. transit passengers have about one-tenth the traﬃc fatality rate as automobile
occupants.

Figure 3. Canadian Death Rate by Mode

Source: (CUTA, 2000)
Note: Canadian transit passengers have about one-tenth the traﬃc fatality rate as automobile occupants.
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Figures 1 through 3 show only risks to transit passengers. Transit accidents also
impose “external” risks on other road users (motorists, pedestrians and cyclists),
but the marginal external risk of an additional transit passenger-kilometer is
small, since most transit systems have excess capacity (only if additional ridership
requires additional transit vehicles would external risk increase) and automobile
travel imposes comparable external risks. For more discussion of marginal transit
risk, see Litman 2005a and 2005b.
Shifting travel from automobile to transit and creating more transit-oriented
communities increases safety for transit passengers and other road users. Total
per-capita traﬃc fatality rates (including automobile, transit and pedestrian
deaths) tend to decline as transit ridership increases in a community, as indicated
in Figure 4. The decline in traﬃc fatalities associated with increased transit use
probably results from a combination of reduced per-capita annual vehicle mileage, lower average traﬃc speeds in higher-density areas, and reduced driving by
higher-risk motorists, such as teenagers and habitual drunk drivers, due to better
alternatives to automobile travel. Transit is a signiﬁcant contributor to each of
these factors.

Figure 4. Trafﬁc Deaths and Transit Mileage,
U.S. Cities (based on FTA data)

36

Terrorism, Transit and Public Safety

Residents of more transit-oriented urban regions experience far lower per-capita
traﬃc fatality rates than in automobile-oriented regions, as illustrated in Figure 5.
Overall, transit passengers are much safer than motorists, and residents of transitoriented communities are safer than residents of automobile-oriented communities, even taking into account risks from murder and terrorism (Lucy 2002).

Figure 5. Annual Per Capita Trafﬁc Deaths

Source: Litman, 2004
Note: Transit-oriented urban regions have signiﬁcantly lower
per-capita traﬃc fatality rates than more automobile-oriented
cities. “Most Transit Oriented” are the 10 U.S. cities with the
highest per-capita annual transit mileage (333 to 1,004 annual
transit passenger miles). “Mixed” are the next 20 cities ranked
by transit mileage (118 to 254 annual transit passenger miles).
“Most Automobile Oriented” are the remainder (15 to 114
annual transit passenger-miles).

International data also indicate that per-capita traffic fatalities decline with
increased transit ridership, as indicated in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. International Trafﬁc Deaths

Source: (Kenworthy and Laube, 2000)

Annual road and rail traﬃc deaths total 286 in the London region, about 3,500 in
the U.K., and more than 43,000 in the U.S., of which only a small portion involve
public transit passengers, as summarized in Table 1.

Table 1. Trafﬁc Fatality Data Summary

Source: (TfL, 2004; DfT, 2004; BTS, 2004)
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Of the 286 transportation fatalities in London, only 5.6 percent involved public
transport passengers, although public transport provides 24.2 percent of total passenger trips and 20.1 percent of passenger-kilometers, as indicated in Table 2.

Table 2. London Area 2003 Travel and Fatalities By Mode

Source: (TfL, 2004)

If public transit had the same fatality rate per passenger-mile as automobile travel,
there would have been 104 more deaths in London, 300 in the U.K., and 148 in the
U.S. in 2003 (calculations in www.vtpi.org/transitrisk.xls). These are lower-bound
estimates because they assume that each transit passenger-mile replaces just one
automobile passenger-mile. However, when people shift from driving to transit,
they tend to reduce their annual mileage, because transit users often choose closer
destinations and avoid unnecessary trips. As public transit ridership increases in a
community, per-capita vehicle ownership tends to decline, and land use patterns
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become more accessible and walkable, further reducing vehicle mileage. Described
diﬀerently, as a community becomes more automobile-oriented, destinations
tend to disperse, due, in part, to the need to dedicate more land to roads and
parking facilities, causing people to travel more to maintain a given level of accessibility.
As a result, each transit passenger-mile often replaces several automobile vehiclemiles (Litman 2004). This is one of the reasons that increased per capita transit
ridership provides such large reduction in per-capita traffic fatality rates, as
indicated earlier. If residents of the “Transit Oriented” regions described earlier
in Figure 5 had the same traﬃc fatality rate as the “Automobile-Oriented,” there
would be about 2,500 additional traﬃc fatalities in the U.S. (calculations in www.
vtpi.org/transitrisk.xls).
These safety beneﬁts of transit are much larger than deaths and injuries caused by
recent terrorist attacks. In addition, public transit provides other health beneﬁts,
by reducing air pollution and increasing physical exercise, since most transit trips
involve walking or cycling links. Although these health beneﬁts are diﬃcult to
quantify, they appear to be large, indicating far greater total health beneﬁts from
transit and, therefore, much larger disbeneﬁts when people shift from transit to
driving (Litman 2003). Travelers would increase their total risk if they shift from
transit to driving in response to terrorist threats.
Transit risks tend to receive more attention than automobile risks. Because they
are rare, incidents that kill or injure a few transit passengers often receive national
or international media attention, while automobile crashes that kill a few people
are so common they are considered local news, and injury accidents often receive
no media coverage at all. For example, in 1995 the death of three passengers in a
Toronto subway crash was widely reported in British Columbia. The same week,
the death of four teenagers in a car crash was a local news story without media
coverage in Toronto. This suggests that a transit passenger death receives about
100 times as much media coverage as an automobile passenger death.
Traﬃc accidents actually represents a much greater risk than terrorism (Adams
2005):
• On an average day, 9 people die and over 800 are injured in British road
accidents. The July 7 London terrorist deaths represent about six days of
normal traﬃc fatalities.
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• The 191 people killed March 11, 2004, by Madrid bombers were equivalent
to about 12 or 13 days of normal traﬃc deaths in Spain.
• During the 25 worst years of sectarian violence in Northern Ireland, twice
as many people died there in road accidents as were killed by terrorists.
• In Israel, the annual road traﬃc death toll has been two or three times higher
than civilian deaths by Palestinian terrorists during the violent years of 2000
through 2003.
• The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks killed about the same number
of people as a typical month of U.S. traﬃc accidents. According to oﬃcial
reports, terrorists killed 25 Americans worldwide in 2002, 23 in 2003, and
none in 2004, while about 42,000 Americans died in traﬃc accidents each
of these years.
There are several reasons that people react particularly strongly to terrorist attacks
(Adams 2005). Such attacks are designed to be highly visible, producing intense
media coverage. The fact that the harm they cause is intentional rather than accidental makes them particularly tragic and frustrating. And they raise fears that
such attacks may become more frequent or severe, so risks may increase in the
future. For these reasons, it is not surprising that transit terrorism tends to instill
more fear than other risks that are actually much greater overall. That is exactly
what terrorists intend.
This is not to suggest that transit terrorism risks are insigniﬁcant and should be
ignored. On the contrary, transit terrorism is a serious threat that harms people
both directly, through injury and property damage, and indirectly by creating fear
and confusion. Strong action is justiﬁed to protect transit users’ safety and sense
of security.
Society should work aggressively to prevent terrorists attacks, respond to incidents, and bring terrorists to justice. Transportation professionals, and transit
operators and users should be cautious and vigilant (for more discussion of strategies for increasing transit security, see the “Address Security Concerns” chapter
of the VTPI Online TDM Encyclopedia at www.vtpi.org/tdm/tdm37.htm). Many
transport organizations are currently working to increase transit security (APTA,
2005; FTA, 2005; MTI, 2005; Loukaitou-Sideris, 2005). Much more can be done. The
federal government spent $22 billion—more than $9 per passenger—on air transportation security after September 11, 2001 attacks, but less than 1¢ per passenger
to increase railway and subway security (Howitt and Makler 2005).
41

Journal of Public Transportation, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2005

But it is important for individuals and public oﬃcials to take all risks into account
and avoid overreacting to transit terrorism risks in ways that increase overall danger. Transit terrorism would cause greater total casualties and harm to society if
individual travelers respond to exaggerated fears by shifting from public transit
to less safe modes, or if decision makers respond by reducing support for public
transit.
Such shifts have occurred. Analysis by Gigerenzer (2004) and Sivak and Flannagan
(2004) indicate that in the three months after the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks, shifts from air to automobile travel caused several hundred additional
roadway traﬃc fatalities. Since air travel is safer per mile than driving, particularly
on rural roads, total travel deaths increased. Had these trends continued for more
than a year, the additional deaths would have exceeded the September 11 terrorist deaths. Because of actions by governments and the airline industry to increase
air travel security, these travel shifts have been reduced, reducing excess traﬃc
deaths.
After a high-proﬁle transit accident or attack, news reporters sometimes stick a
microphone in front of transit riders and ask, “How can you possibly continue
using transit after what just happened?” with the implication that riding transit is
dangerous and foolish. This reﬂects the myopic tendency of news media to consider just one issue at a time. But people and policy makers must balance many
factors, including overall safety, eﬃciency, and aﬀordability. It would be foolish for
travelers to reduce their transit travel in response to a terrorist attack, despite the
fact that transit is an extremely safe mode of travel and provides other beneﬁts to
users and society.
When terrorist attacks occur, responsible leaders rightfully recommend that
people return to their normal habits, including public transit travel. Cities repair
their public transit systems and people use them, both for practical reasons and
to show they are not intimidated by terrorism.
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Abstract
The main objective of this study was to assess usefulness of 3-D, nonlinear dynamic,
explicit computer codes for transit safety and security research. An analysis of
response of a paratransit bus structure under loading caused by high explosive (HE)
detonation is presented. It was assumed that the cubic HE charge detonates in the air
near the bus. The ground was modeled as a rigid stationary wall. The problem was
studied using LS DYNA, an explicit, 3-D, dynamic, nonlinear ﬁnite element program.
The HE detonation and the processes of shock propagation in the air were modeled using the mesh with the Euler’s formulation. The Euler’s mesh was modeled as
a rectangular prism suﬃciently large enough to cover the entire bus structure. The
nonreﬂecting boundary conditions on the top and side surfaces of the Euler’s domain
and the sliding interface on the bottom side for the contact with the ground were
assumed.
A ﬁnite element model of the Ford Eldorado Aerotech 240 paratransit bus was
developed for this study. This model consisted of 73,600 ﬁnite elements and had
174 deﬁned properties (groups of elements with the same features) and 23 material
models.
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Computational analysis provided useful information about dynamic deformations
and damage inﬂicted to the bus structure under load blast wave activated by the
HE detonation. It allowed for detailed, rigorous analyses of time histories of accelerations, velocities, deformations, and stresses. Resulting acceleration and overpressure
histories were correlated with expected blast injuries of the bus passengers. The data
obtained can be used to improve passenger safety and to reduce the threat of suicidal
terrorist attacks against public transit. Changes in the bus structure and replacement
of some materials to build a safer class of vehicles can be carefully considered and
implemented.

Introduction
Two diﬀerent approaches can be used for analysis of the structural response of
a bus under loading caused by high explosive (HE) detonation. The ﬁrst method
is based on applying a previously known function of loading (pressure surfaces)
to the structure. The time space characteristics of pressure loads can be deﬁned
based on data collected in a series of experiments. The same methodology is used
for building the mine impulse-loading model (Westine et al. 1985). Although
simple, this method of analysis of the structure behavior under blast loading leads
to serious limitations. First, no interaction between the structure response and
the acting force (blast wave) is included. Yet the actual response of the structure
may have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on magnitude and distribution of air pressure in time,
which resulted in this response. Moreover, extrapolation from a ﬁnite set of data to
speciﬁc conditions (geometry, type of HE, its location, etc.) introduces additional
modeling errors. Simultaneous modeling and interaction of both processes—the
response of the structure and the explosion with shock generation and its propagation in the air—is free of these disadvantages. Insuﬃcient computational power
of commonly accessible computers did not allow for implementing this concept
in the past. Rapid growth of CPU speed in the new generation of mainframe
computers allows for solving these problems. For example, Vulitsky and Karni
(2002) successfully analyzed a ship structure subjected to HE detonation. The
authors simpliﬁed their model to a plate loaded by a pressure wave. Another work
presented the results of calculations for a response of protective structures to an
internal explosion with blast venting (Kivity 1993), where a rectangular prism shell
with venting holes was used as a structural model. A concrete structure with ambient inside and outside air was modeled. One-fourth of the entire physical problem
was considered due to symmetry. More examples can be found in the literature,
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which provide evidence that this approach is becoming dominant. This study
continues these trends, which combines advanced modeling of bus structure with
simultaneous modeling of blast pressure waves.

Explosion Model
A preliminary analysis of the structural response of a bus under loading caused by
HE detonation was performed. Collected data regarding the amount of explosive
materials and their possible location during suicidal terrorist attacks on a bus led
to several physical assumptions. An explosive charge of 13 kg of C4 detonated in
the air, 1 meter above the ground and at a distance of 1.5 meters from the bus
(see Figure 1), was assumed. The HE was considered as a cube with a 20 cm edge
Figure 1. Geometry of a Bus Structure under Loading
Caused by Explosion of an HE in the Air Domain
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and the point of initiation of detonation in its center. The ground was modeled
as a rigid stationary wall. The problem was studied using LS DYNA, an explicit, 3D, nonlinear ﬁnite element code. The HE detonation and the processes of shock
propagation in the air were modeled using the mesh with the Euler’s formulation.
This option was applied using the Arbitrary Lagrangian Eulerian Algorithm (ALE),
available in LS-DYNA. The Euler’s grid, modeled as a rectangular prism (WxLxH:
5.5x9x3.5 m), was suﬃciently large enough to cover the entire bus structure. The
nonreﬂecting boundary conditions on the top and side surfaces of the Euler’s
domain and the sliding interface on the bottom side for the contact with the
ground were assumed. Figures 2 and 3 show the ﬁnite element model (FEM) developed for explosion and shock propagation modeling in the air domain.

Figure 2. Isometric View of the FEM with Euler’s Domain

The bottom side of the cube in Figure 2 represents ground modeled as a rigid wall.
The FE ground model consists of 5,096 shell elements with a typical edge length of
10 cm. Figure 3 presents the cross section of the Euler mesh along with HE charge
symmetry plane normal to the bus. The Euler formulation allows for material mixing and mass transfer between FEM elements. The zoomed-in rectangle in Figure
3 shows diﬀerent grid regions. The entire mesh consists of 241,104 hex elements
with a typical edge length of 1 cm for HE to a maximum of 10 cm for air and a suitable intermediate zone between them.
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Figure 3. FEM for Euler’s Domain: HE and the Air

Cross section along HE charge symmetry plane normal to the bus. The area close to the HE
location is zoomed in the rectangle in the upper-right part of the ﬁgure.

The detonation process was implemented through the automated programmed
burn model, supported by LS-DYNA. Velocity of the Detonation Wave (DW) and
the thermodynamical parameters on DW front were assumed to be known in this
model. A sphere surface was assumed as the best DW front shape since the initiation of detonation begins in the center point of HE charge. The energy contained
in the HE was assumed as immediately released inside the front of detonation
wave as a result of the chemical reaction
HE→PD + Q
where:
Q represents the heat eﬀect of this reaction
PD are products of detonations
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In addition, 100 percent of HE mass was assumed to transfer to PD. The Jones
Wilkins Lee (JWL) Equation (1) was used to characterize the products of detonation of the C4 HE:

(1)

where:

HE




equals

e

represents HE e

HE

refers to density of the HE

p

represents pressure of PD

e

is speciﬁc internal energy of PD



equals density of PD

A, B, R1 , R2 , ω

are empirical constants determined for the speciﬁc type
of HE

Table 1 includes values of all these constants found in the JWL equation (Wlodarczyk 1994) for C4 HE used in this work.

Table 1. Constants for the JWL Equation of State for PD of C4
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The equation of state for an ideal gas with the speciﬁc heat ratio of 7/5 was applied
for the air. Coupling between Euler (air domain) and Lagrange (bus structure)
formulations was accomplished by using an appropriate LS DYNA feature called
CONSTRAINED_LAGRANGE_IN_SOLID. The interaction between bus structures
and shock was modeled by Penalty Algorithm, an LS-DYNA feature, while shock
and ground interaction was modeled as a sliding interface.

Bus Model
Since blueprints and design data of the paratransit bus were not available, the
reverse engineering process (Chenga et al. 2001) was adopted to acquire geometric data and to develop the FEM for computational mechanics analysis. The actual
bus was carefully disassembled into individual parts to allow for accurate geometric data acquisition. All structural components were taped, scanned, digitized,
and mapped into the computer. In addition to geometric entities (e.g., surfaces,
curves, points), material and structural properties (e.g., thickness, material type,
and weight) were also collected. Subsequently, the scanned geometry for each
part was imported into a preprocessor. After all nonstructural components were
removed from the bus, its structure was thoroughly examined. The disassembly
process resulted in full exposure of the connections of the major components.
Joints among the structural parts, such as hinges, rivets, welds, bolts, and rubber
pads were identiﬁed and were appropriately modeled on the computer using multipoint constraints (MPCs), spot welds, node merging, and node tying.
Scanned geometric data were imported into MSC/PATRAN (2001), a graphical
preprocessor, in which FE meshes were constructed and modiﬁed. Decisions
regarding element formulations, material models, material characteristics, contact
algorithms, MPCs and connections, loading and boundary conditions, solution
parameters, and others were made to complete the model (Bathe 1998; Omar et
al. 1999). Limited laboratory tests were performed for selected structural components and material samples to identify material parameters and connection
characteristics.
MPC provided an opportunity to model connection bolts, screws, and welds with
failure (LS-DYNA 1999). An example of modeling of spot weld in the bus cage
using MPCs can be found in (Kwasniewski et al. 2002).
Self-automatic contact was applied to all the elements in the model. Twenty-three
material types were identiﬁed for the structural components of the actual bus. The
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bus body was modeled using two layers of composite material with an additional
honeycomb layer placed in between them. Composite layers were modeled using
shell elements while honeycomb was represented by solid elements.
Signiﬁcant numbers of the vehicle components were modeled with shell elements
since most of the structural parts of the bus were made of metal and composite
sheets. A fully integrated quad element number 16, available in LS-DYNA, was
selected for analysis as the most reliable element formulation, based on several
numerical tests (Alem 1996). The actual Eldorado paratransit bus is shown in Figure 4, while its ﬁnal FEM is shown in Figure 5.

Figure 4.
Ford Eldorado
Paratransit Bus

Figure 5.
FEM of the
Paratransit Bus

The bus FEM consisted of 174 parts, 23 material models, and 73,595 elements. A
summary of the ﬁnal FEM of the bus is provided in Table 2.
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Table 2. Summary of the FEM Bus
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Number of parts (LS-DYNA)/ Property sets
Number of material models
Number of nodes
Number of solid elements
Number of shell elements
Number of beam elements
Total number of elements

174
23
67,788
9,612
63,271
712
73,595

Analysis and Results
Selected results of this study are presented below. A cube near the front door of
the bus in Figure 6 represents the initial position of the HE charge.

Figure 6. Initial Position of HE Charge and Bus Structure

The bus structure was immersed in the Euler air mesh domain so that the distance
from an arbitrary element to the nearest boundary was at least 0.5 m. Figure 7
shows the isosurfaces of the pressure in the air after 270 microseconds from the
initiation of detonation. The pressure fringes were cut oﬀ between 0.101MPa and
0.5 MPa for better visualization. The interior surface surrounds space where the
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blast pressure is larger then 0.5 MPa, while the exterior surface is the boundary of
the outside region with the pressure smaller then 0.101 MPa. A blast wave activated by the HE detonation is shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7. Isosurfaces of the Pressure in the Air after 270 Microseconds from
Initiation HE Detonation: A Blast Wave Activated by the HE Detonation.

Figure 8 depicts the deformation and damage to the bus structure after the ﬁrst
30 milliseconds. Interestingly, although HE charge has been detonated outside the
bus, the bus structure behaves at some point of time as a pressurized balloon with
vent holes. The shock eﬀect and accelerations were examined for four selected
points located on the plane of the longitudinal cross section through the bus
(Figure 9).
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Figure 8. Damage after First 30 Milliseconds

Figure 9. Longitudinal Cross-Section of the Bus Structure
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Asterisks were used to mark two points for acceleration analysis; two squares
indicate pressure histories. Figure 10 presents the velocity time history for selected
points of the bus structure.
Figure 10. Velocity Time History for Selected Points
(see two asterisks in Figure 9)

Average accelerations calculated from coarse approximations of velocity versus
time curves reach values of 175g and 240g, where g represents the earth acceleration. Such accelerations result in brain damage or a leg fracture as shown in Table
3. Table 3 shows injury criteria resulting from a mine blast. These criteria were
developed by Alem (1996), and were successfully applied by Williams and FillionGourdeau (2002).
Another dangerous factor aﬀecting human life is a short duration of over/under
pressure changes, referred to as shock eﬀect. Tables 4a and 4b show the summary
of the experimental studies of damage eﬀects caused by high-energy explosives
(Turin, unpublished materials). Although rabbits, rats, and pigs were used in these
studies, similar eﬀects can be expected for humans. Results from the pig tests are
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Table 3. Mine Blast Acceleration Injury Assessment
Part

Shock/Acceleration

Injury

Head
Pelvis
Feet

a=150g for 2 ms
a=40g for 7ms
v=3.5 to 5.0 m/s

High risk of brain damage
High risk of spinal cord damage
Apparition of lower leg fracture

Source: Alem 1996.

Table 4a. Overpressure and Blast Injuries

Injury
Barotrauma
Mild contusion
Moderate injury
Heavy injury
Lethal injury

Overpressure Values*
[kPa]
Rabbits

Pigs

56
134
217
280
490

56
130
237
371
1074

*Turin, unpublished materials.

Table 4b. Cutoff ∆P Values and Blast Injuries

Injury
Barotrauma
Lung hemorrhage
Lethal (death)

Cutoﬀ ∆P Values*
[kPa]
Rabbits

Pigs

33
43
180

113
102
880

*Turin, unpublished materials.
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of particular interest because of the pigs’ similarity to human mass and structure
of body tissues. The cutoﬀ pressure ∆P is also dangerous for humans since it can
cause damage, as shown in Tables 4a and b.
Figure 11 presents the pressure time history for selected points of the bus structure marked as two squares in Figure 9.

Figure 11. Pressure Time History for Selected Points
(see two squares in Figure 9)

The overpressure reached a value of about 100 kPa at the ﬁrst point and 40 kPa
at the second one, while the cutoﬀ ∆P pressures were 150 kPa and 90 kPa, respectively. Passengers located near these places were likely to be subjected to barotrauma, mild contusion, and lung hemorrhage.

Conclusions
The principal objective of this project was to carry out the feasibility study of
capabilities of FEA for assessment of structural response of a paratransit bus, and
survivability of passengers under a suicide terrorist attack. An appropriate meth60
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odology was developed and was successfully used for this problem. Formulation
of further, more practical conclusions, would require additional studies. Future
research should include a validation process of the bus FEM, numerical data of the
shock propagation in the air, as well as validation of shock/structure interaction
models through experimental data.
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Abstract
The purpose of this study was to illustrate that a systems approach to transit safety
can be used to develop a methodology to fail-safe or mistake-proof paratransit
operations. The fail-safe methodology illustrated in this article was implemented in
a small rural transit system in the southeast U.S. Results demonstrated that safety
problems often stem from an interaction of service errors and system components.
Results also revealed that fail-safe methods that target speciﬁc user groups are more
eﬀective than more general methods.

Introduction
Mistakes occur in all paratransit systems. Some of these mistakes may lead to signiﬁcant service failures that could endanger passengers, drive up insurance costs,
diminish productivity, and damage the transit system’s reputation. Advanced
computer software and state-of-the-art equipment do not insulate paratransit
systems from errors that could compromise service safety (Einstein 2001). Moreover, many transit systems, especially rural and small urban systems, cannot aﬀord
expensive technology or external consultants to help them mistake-proof operations.
Given increasing liability costs, paratransit managers need inexpensive yet eﬀective error prevention techniques that are easy to understand and simple to imple65
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ment. To meet this need, this study developed a fail-safe methodology to help
managers identify and correct mistakes before they generate signiﬁcant safety
problems. This fail-safe methodology represents a hands-on approach to reducing
errors in service delivery. Like other quality management tools, fail-safe techniques
have played a role in industrial quality programs for many years (Stewart 2003). In
contrast to statistical process control methods, which require statistical analysis
of large amounts of historical data, fail-safe techniques emphasize performance
standards, worker empowerment, and information ﬂows to prevent defects. This
study will illustrate how an actual paratransit system used a fail-safe methodology
to analyze the error generation and prevention process in its operations.
The next section provides an overview of the systems approach to the mistakeprooﬁng process for service safety. A discussion of the research context and the
methodology follows this overview. An application of the methodology in an
actual paratransit system is then presented. The article concludes with the managerial implications of the study.

A Systems Approach to Paratransit Safety
The delivery of safe transit service requires a coordinated eﬀort between transit
workers and transit customers, as well as the eﬀective use of technology and
management and control systems (Prioni and Hensher 2000). Since a safe operation is the product of the entire transit system rather than a single component
of the system, preventing mistakes that could endanger passengers or lead to
injury, accidents, or property damage requires a systemwide approach (Sulek and
Lind 2000). In describing their framework for service delivery, Chase and Bowen
(1991) emphasized the need for a systems approach when analyzing and improving service operations and identiﬁed technology, systems and people as the three
major components of service operations. This article will adopt Chase and Bowen’s
systems framework to study how potentially harmful mistakes may be generated
in a paratransit system and how these mistakes could be prevented before they
endanger system employees, the public, or property.
Like Chase and Bowen’s (1991) framework, the systems approach that will guide
this fail-safe study models technology, systems and people as the three major
components of service delivery. In a paratransit system, the technology component includes vehicles, lift equipment, machinery, and tools, as well as facilities like
garages and administrative oﬃces. The systems component involves procedures
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and software for scheduling, routing, maintenance, transport, inventory, planning,
and performance evaluation. The ﬁnal component, people, encompasses both the
service providers, such as drivers and oﬃce personnel, and community stakeholders, such as riders, local agencies, medical providers, and industries.
An eﬀective fail-safe methodology should address all three system components
and help the manager anticipate how these components might interact to produce errors that could endanger others or damage property. For example, if a driver
lacks technical skills or knowledge, he may make a serious mistake in operating the
van lift equipment and injure himself or the passenger (people-technology interaction). If the scheduling system does not capture critical information regarding
a passenger (e.g., the rider is hearing impaired), the driver will not be forewarned
of a potential safety problem (people-system interaction). If the maintenance
scheduling software is not reliable, it may fail to schedule routine maintenance for
a van. Poor maintenance could result in mechanical failure that may endanger the
driver and riders (technology-system interaction). If the scheduling software does
not remind a driver that it is time for a routine physical, a health problem may go
unnoticed until driver impairment causes a traﬃc accident (people-system-technology interaction) (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Systems Model of Paratransit Service Delivery
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Not all service errors arise from an interaction of two or more system components.
Some mistakes result from the people component alone (Friman et al. 1998). For
instance, a dispatcher could jeopardize an elderly dialysis patient’s health by not
promptly notifying a van driver that the patient was ready for pick-up from the
doctor’s oﬃce. A driver may spend too long taking a break and later try to compensate for lost time by rushing passengers. A front-oﬃce worker may forget to
notify a passenger about a change in rider eligibility status. These types of workergenerated mistakes clearly require fail-safe measures.
Fail-safe measures also apply to the behaviors and attitudes of paratransit customers. In many services, a signiﬁcant proportion of problems stem from mistakes
made by the customers themselves. Chase and Stewart (1994) identiﬁed three
major sources of customer mistakes: (1) failure to understand and anticipate the
customer’s role during service delivery; (2) failure to follow instructions, remember crucial steps, or communicate service needs during the service process; and (3)
failure to alert management about service problems once the service is complete.
Since riders and other paratransit customers can make any of these mistakes, failsafe methods that target customer participation skills and information access can
help promote paratransit safety.
In particular, elderly riders may beneﬁt from such fail-saﬁng eﬀorts. The number
of elderly citizens in the United States is expected to increase signiﬁcantly as
baby boomers age. Mobilty needs of the elderly are expected to increase as larger
numbers of older adults try to lead active lives, despite age-related problems that
impair driving skills (Rosenbloom 2001). Elderly drivers tend to experience high
accident rates (Burkhardt 1999); moreover, even conservative projections indicate
that, by 2030, the number of fatalities in automobile accidents involving elderly
drivers will quadruple the 1996 level (Hildebrand 2003; Burkhardt and McGavock
1999). Paratransit services that are safe and easy for elderly riders to use can reduce
the need for older adults with serious health problems to drive. In addition, failsafe methods can help elderly riders use paratransit systems safely.
In addition to addressing the people, technology and systems components of service delivery, a fail-safe methodology must also analyze the relationships among
the various stages in paratransit service. There are two arguments for modeling
paratransit service as a multistage process. First, the consequences of the interactions among technology, people, and systems may vary with the service stage. For
instance, if a dialysis patient unbuckled one of his safety belts during transport,
serious injury could result if the driver had to slam on the brakes suddenly. If
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the van has already stopped at the dialysis center when the rider unbuckles the
belt, risk to the patient is not nearly so great. Second, the stages of paratransit
service are not independent of one another. What happens at one stage may
aﬀect service delivery a later stage. If unchecked, small mistakes made during an
early, or upstream, stage of the service process may “snowball” into problems at a
downstream stage (Perrow 1984) (Figure 2). These problems may involve minor
incidents or catastrophic failure. For instance, if the ﬁrst passenger on a route is
late for pick-up, the driver may not be able to pick up other passengers on time.
These other passengers could arrive late for their medical appointments or miss
them entirely, thus endangering their well-being.

Figure 2. System Failure/Snowball Effect

Although interdependency among service stages is quite common in many service operations, little research has been done to illustrate the eﬀectiveness of a
multistage approach to process improvement (Sulek 2004). However, a few recent
articles in the service management literature have argued that a stage-by-stage
analysis of a service operation can reveal problems that could be overlooked by
organization-level analysis alone. For instance, Souteriou and Hadjinicola (1999)
used a multistage approach to optimize customer perception with service delivery. Armstrong (1995) modeled the eﬀect of service interventions in multiple
service stages as a function of customer perceptions and service attributes at each
stage. Sulek, Marucheck and Lind (2005) analyzed labor productivity in a multistage service process consisting of serially dependent stages.
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A fail-safe methodology based on multistage analysis can do more than help
managers avoid routine errors; it can also help to prevent major service failures
that appear to occur simply by chance. Perrow (1984) discussed such failures and
concluded that many result from an unanticipated interaction of multiple errors
that arise from multiple sources. These errors, taken individually, may not seem
signiﬁcant, yet their interaction can produce catastrophic consequences.
Since even small mistakes can cause major problems, paratransit managers cannot
aﬀord to be reactive or adopt a hit-or-miss approach in error prevention. Instead,
managers need a more rigorous approach that will help them break the chain of
service errors that can lead to safety problems or catastrophic service failures. The
following section describes such a fail-safe methodology and discusses how it was
used to mistake-proof operations at a small urban transit system.

Research Context and Method
A rural paratransit system located in western North Carolina served as the
research context for this study. The system served an area covering 500 square
miles and operated 27 lift vans. The system’s exposure to safety problems had risen
signiﬁcantly over the past decade, with vehicle miles increasing from 325,000 miles
per year to 750,000 miles per year and the number of passenger trips growing from
50,000 trips per year to 90,000 trips per year. Providing safe, dependable transport
was a priority for the manager of this system. The manager realized that mistakes
had led to accidents and service incidents in the past and decided to apply fail-safe
procedures to aspects of operations that could compromise safety.
To begin the fail-safe eﬀort, the manager and the authors used system records,
the manager’s expert knowledge, and process mapping to model service ﬂows and
identify key service stages or links. Problem areas that needed fail-safe attention
were determined for the stages in the process map. An iterative process, as shown
in Figure 3, was used to trace problem causes and devise and assess fail-safe solutions.
From this collaborative analysis, a fail-safe methodology was developed. The following activities constitute a continuous fail-safe process:
• Develop and revise a process map of service delivery. By indicating the
individual service delivery stages, the process map will make it easier to
determine where service problems occur (Chase and Stewart 1994).
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Figure 3. Fail-Safe Process

• Create a list of service problems that occur at each service stage in the
process map. Maintaining a list of problems and complaints as they arise
will help with this step. Using this list, feedback from transit employees
and customers, system performance metrics, and maintenance and repair
records, the manager can anticipate future safety incidents and problems.
• Identify the causes or errors that could lead to the problems listed in the
preceding step. Finding the causes often involves working backward through
the process to identify the original mistakes that “snowballed” or escalated
into downstream service failures.
• Devise fail-safe solutions to prevent the types of mistakes that were identiﬁed in the preceding step.
• Develop service performance metrics based on operating data to assess the
eﬀectiveness of the fail-safe methods.
• Gather feedback from service customers to assess quality of service delivery.
• Use the performance metrics and customer feedback to update the fail-safe
methods and improve service performance.
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An initial activity in the fail-safe process involves charting all of the critical stages
that service delivery entails. The process map should accomplish three important
objectives: (1) trace the rider’s participation in service delivery; (2) highlight critical
back-oﬃce tasks; and (3) identify all major points of interaction between transit
employees and riders. It is important to meet all three objectives because riders’
mistakes, employees’ errors, and problematic interactions between transit workers and customers all contribute to safety problems.
Figure 4 presents a process map for paratransit services provided by the small
system that served as the research context in this study. The process map depicts
eight critical stages in this paratransit operation: (1) the rider’s initial request for
service, which is shown as the Rider-Dispatcher link on the diagram; (2) conﬁrmation that the rider is eligible for services, which involves the Department of Social
Services (DSS)/Agency-Dispatcher link; (3) ride scheduling, which involves the Dispatcher-Scheduler link; (4) manifest creation, which involves the Scheduler-Driver
link; (5) rider pick-up, which involves the Driver-Rider Pick-Up link; (6) transport
of riders to their appointments, which is shown as the Rider-Transport link; (7)
rider pick-up after their appointments, which involves the Doctor’s Oﬃce-Driver
link; and (8) transport of the riders back home, which is shown as the Return Trip
link.
The next phase of the fail-safe process involves an examination of each critical
link in transit service delivery. A close look at each link can help the manager
Figure 4. Transit Process Flow
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determine the types of service problems that could occur at each stage and make
it easier to identify the mistakes that caused them. The analysis should include all
service problems—not just apparent safety problems—because an interaction of
even minor service errors can sometimes generate serious incidents. Tables 1 and
2 illustrate the problem/cause analysis phase for two service links: the Driver-Rider
Pick-Up link and the Transport link. (Similar tables were developed for the other
service links but are not shown.)
Table 1. Driver-Rider Pick-Up Link:
Service Problems and Mistakes
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In the Driver-Rider Pick-Up link, both riders and drivers face such service problems
as late pick-ups, boarding mishaps, and physical barriers to boarding. As Table 1
illustrates, these problems stem from a variety of causes.
Riders can cause pick-up delays if they are not ready to leave when the van arrives,
if hearing impairment prevents them from hearing the driver blowing the horn,
or if they simply forget to cancel their ride appointments. Agencies like nursing
homes also cause delays and no-shows if they do not have patients ready for transport when the van arrives. All of these mistakes involve the people component
of the service system. On the other hand, there are a number of other causes for
late pick-ups that are beyond an individual’s control. These include heavy traﬃc,
accidents, road construction, and adverse weather conditions. Schedule creep also
contributes to late pick-ups.
Boarding mishaps can occur if riders who use wheelchairs rely on inadequate
homemade ramps to help them exit their homes. Such ramps can easily collapse,
injuring both the passenger and the driver. Without an adequate ramp, a driver
may require a great deal of extra assistance with the passenger. In some cases, it
may be impossible to get the rider on board safely, and the driver may have to
refuse service to the passenger. A driver will also refuse service when parents try
to bring children on board without approved safety seats. Both of these problems
involve both the technology and people components of service delivery, since
rider ignorance and faulty equipment can diminish safety.
Sometimes a driver in this paratransit operation cannot get the van close enough
to the rider’s home for a pick-up. A number of physical barriers can block safe
access to a rider’s home. For instance, fallen trees or tree limbs may obstruct the
driveway; the driveway itself may be too steep, too winding, or too long to travel
over safely; or the road surface may contain deep ruts or be too muddy. Drivers
may ﬁnd that even if a driveway is fairly safe, there is no way to easily push a wheelchair across the passenger’s yard to the van. A driver may need a great deal of extra
help in conveying a wheelchair rider to the van if no sidewalks are available.
Table 2, which shows the Rider-Transport link, describes the kinds of problems
a passenger might experience during an actual ride. The worst problems include
traﬃc accidents, which stem from poor driving technique by the van operator;
driver inattention, driver impairment and on-board distraction; passenger injuries,
which result from traﬃc accidents; failure to secure passengers in their seats; and
passengers’ misunderstanding of the rider’s role during transit. At this paratransit
system, some wheelchair riders have been injured after unfastening seat belts and
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Table 2. Transport Link:
Service Problems and Causes

straps while the van was nearing the dialysis center. These passengers thought they
were being helpful by speeding up the unloading process and did not realize that
their behavior was inappropriate and unsafe until it was too late. To a large extent,
these problems involve the people component of service delivery.
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Vehicle breakdowns and equipment malfunction can also give the impression that
a ride is not a safe one or can lead to accidents. These problems may stem from
poor preventive maintenance, unsuitable operating environments (such as badly
rutted dirt roads), or inadequate equipment (such as an air conditioning system
that is too small to cool the van if the doors are opened frequently). These types
of problems pertain mostly to the systems and technology components of service
delivery.
Even if a passenger considers a ride safe, he or she may ﬁnd it unpleasant. This can
occur if the driver is rude or unhelpful to passengers, if the ride is not smooth, or
if fellow passengers are disruptive or threatening. The passenger may also believe
that the service is too slow. While poor road conditions can make a trip seem
longer, a driver’s failure to stay on schedule can also delay a trip. The people component of service delivery contributes to many of these service problems.

Development of Fail-Safe Methods
Once a manager identiﬁes mistakes that cause service problems, fail-safe methods
can be developed to reduce the chance of service errors. These fail-safe methods
may involve improving access to information, instituting some new operating
procedures, and modifying worker or rider behavior.
As Table 3 shows, the chief causes of late pick-ups and boarding problems on
the Driver/Rider Pick-Up link stem from schedule creep, adverse road or weather
conditions, rider mistakes, and physical barriers to boarding. Better training of
drivers in the importance of on-time pick-ups may help reduce schedule creep.
Reduction of the number of no-shows can also help diminish schedule creep. To
help minimize no-shows, the dispatcher at this system could phone elderly riders the day before their appointments to remind them of the pick-up time. The
dispatcher could also phone nursing homes with high no-show rates 10 minutes
before scheduled pick-ups and ask personnel to have the patient ready for pickup. In the event of adverse travel conditions, the dispatcher at this system could
call the doctor’s oﬃce to try to reschedule the rider for a later appointment or
might call the rider to cancel the pick-up if the roads are unsafe. The dispatcher
also can help prevent some of the riders’ mistakes by asking them to be ready one
hour early for pick-ups on long routes or by reminding a parent to bring along an
approved child’s seat if his or her child will be riding in the van.
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Table 3. Driver/Rider Pick-Up Link:
Problem Causes and Fail-Safe Solutions
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The Department of Social Services and individual agencies can also help to educate
parents about the importance of approved safety seats when their children ride in
the van and can explain how to obtain these seats free of charge from the local ﬁre
department. The ﬁre department currently trains parents in the correct use of the
safety seats. The DSS can further decrease rider error by educating riders about the
need to cancel pick-ups if their plans change.
The preceding discussion illustrates that the people component of the system can
help address many of the errors at this service link. In particular, better education of the riders and agencies in their roles as paratransit customers represents a
promising fail-safe approach.
Fail-safe methods that deal with the systems component of service delivery can
also be used at this link. For instance, the transit manager regularly addresses the
problem of physical barriers to boarding. If low tree branches obstruct access to a
rider’s driveway, either the transit manager or the operations manager will inspect
the problem. Usually, they ask the city utility service to clear away the overhanging
tree limbs. In this transit system, volunteers from the local churches and the Senior
Center help to ﬁx ruts in riders’ driveways or clear fallen trees from driveways.
Volunteers also build safe ramps for riders who need but cannot aﬀord them. As
mentioned earlier, safe ramps are essential to boarding safety; a driver may refuse
to board a rider if the ramp appears unsound. If a rider’s yard is inaccessible, the
driver can call the local Emergency Medical Service (EMS), the operations manager, or the transit manager for immediate help with the passenger.
Service problems and potential fail-safe solutions for the Transport link are summarized in Table 4. This table reveals that some of the technical mistakes that drivers make, such as following too closely or driving too fast, stem from insuﬃcient
time to complete the route safely. Poor planning by the driver can cause this time
shortage, but so can schedule creep from no-shows and delays that riders cause
during pick-ups. If a driver attempts to compensate for these delays with aggressive driving, accidents can occur. Thus, fail-safe measures that address no-shows
and rider-generated delays at earlier service links may help reduce the likelihood
of accidents during transport.
Driver training, vehicle inspection, and managerial observation of driver performance also constitute fail-safe methods for the Transport link. Training classes
can target various issues, such as driving techniques, dealing with disruptive passengers, ﬁrst aid/CPR, and drug and alcohol awareness. Reinforcement of material
covered in training classes also serves as a fail-safe method. For instance, a sign with
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Table 4. Transport Link:
Problem Causes and Fail-Safe Solutions

a single question about correct safety procedure (e.g. “How should you hold a baby
to administer CPR?”) can be placed where drivers will see it before they begin their
route. The manifest pick-up point is a good location for such “memory ticklers.”
The preceding discussion shows that many of the fail-safe methods appropriate to
this link involve the people component to a large extent; however, the technology
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component also plays a critical role. Since mechanical failure can cause serious
safety problems with the vehicle or lift equipment, preventive maintenance failsafe methods are especially important. For instance, at this system, each van driver
must inspect his vehicle prior to beginning his route. Among other things, the
driver must measure air pressure in the tires and check the oil level for the engine,
the coolant level, the power steering ﬂuid level, and brake ﬂuid level. After completing the inspection, the driver must complete the pretrip inspection form and
note any problems with the vehicle. He must then either correct the problem or
request another van. Prior to using the replacement van, the driver must conduct
an inspection and complete a pretrip form for the new van. If the manager discovers that a driver either overlooked a problem or did not report it on the pretrip
form, the manager will do the pretrip inspection with the driver until the manager
determines he need no longer do so. The 6,000 mile oil change and inspection for
each vehicle also captures how well each driver maintains his or her vehicle.

Testing the Effectiveness of Fail-Safe Methods
After a manager implements fail-safe methods, he needs to gauge their eﬀectiveness. There is no way for a manager to know if the new methods actually improved
service quality unless he selects and monitors performance metrics for those
aspects of service he was trying to fail-safe. For instance, at this transit system, the
manager created a demand response form to capture data on assigned pick-up
times and actual pick-up times for each rider. The data enabled the manager to
estimate variances in pick-up times and determine if the system was doing a better
job in reducing wait times for passengers. Analysis revealed that a slight variance
reduction (<5%) occurred after driver training classes placed increased emphasis
on meeting pick-up times.
Similarly, the manager collected data on the number of riders that were “no-shows”
when the van arrived for pick-ups. This type of data was useful for determining if
fail-safe measures helped riders do a better job of being ready for pick-up. Analysis
showed that reminder phone calls to elderly riders who were frequent no-shows
reduced the no-show rate for this particular group by 50 percent. Analysis also
showed that the call-ahead policy to nursing homes whose patients were habitually late resulted in an almost 100 percent improvement in the problem.
Another set of metrics for this system reveals the eﬀectiveness of the fail-safe
methods for preventive maintenance. As mentioned earlier, a variety of methods
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such as pretrip inspections, pretrip inspection forms, spot checks by the system
manger and the operations manager, the 6,000-mile oil change and inspection,
and an annual inspection are used to make preventive maintenance fail-safe.
Results reveal that the number of wrecker calls for disabled vans declined by 90
percent. The severity of the problems also declined; before preventive maintenance was made fail-safe, many wrecker calls involved serious mechanical failures
like broken axles or brake failures. After fail-safe procedures were initiated, most
wrecker calls involved a ﬂat tire or a vehicle stuck on a muddy or ﬂooded road.
Other performance metrics conﬁrmed the eﬀectiveness of the fail-safe methods
for preventive maintenance: tire wear improved from 18,000 miles before the failsafe program began to 30,000 miles afterward, while brake lining wear increased
from 14,000 miles to 40,000 miles.
The manager also used the wrecker calls, tire wear, and brake wear metrics to
gauge the eﬀectiveness of the driver training programs. These metrics and tire
wear patterns are also used to compare driver performance and identify which
drivers exhibit erratic driving techniques.
In addition to collecting operating data to assess service quality, the transit
manager gathered information on perceived service quality from customers and
analyzed their suggestions and complaints. The manager at this system routinely
administered a survey on needs and resources to agencies served by the system.
This survey consisted of both scaled questions and open-ended questions. The
scaled questions dealt with such issues as overall satisfaction with paratransit
service, timely provision of service, dependability of service, professional skills
of the drivers, interpersonal skills of the drivers, and courteous and professional
treatment by front-oﬃce employees. The open-ended questions asked what the
system could do to improve service to the agencies and their clients, what agencies considered the major shortfalls in current service, and what gaps existed in
transporting clients. Analysis of the comments revealed that not all clients were
aware of the range of transit services provided by this system and that some customers simply did not understand how to use the system properly. For instance,
one respondent did not realize that transport of patients on oxygen was already
available, while others felt that the system was not responsive to the timing of
their scheduling requests. The manager decided that “refresher” training sessions
for clients at participating agencies would be helpful. At such sessions, the trainer
could not only review the procedures for requesting service but also explain why
certain rules were in place.
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In addition to explaining how to use paratransit services, the trainer at these sessions could also distribute wallet-sized cards listing the most important rules a
rider must follow. Some attendees may beneﬁt from having a handy “reminder
card” to help them remember what to do to successfully access services. If the
print is easy to read and the color of the cards is bright, riders may be more likely
to keep them and refer to them.

Managerial Implications
The purpose of this study was to illustrate that fail-safe methods constitute a
simple, low-tech, low-cost approach to reducing errors that could lead to safety
problems in paratransit operations. While a small paratransit system served as the
study’s research context, the methodology presented in this article is applicable to
other transit operations and to nontransit services.
Results from this study showed that at this transit system, fail-safe measures that
targeted a speciﬁc rider group were far more eﬀective in reducing mistakes than
more generic fail-safe methods. For instance, the “call ahead” policy resulted in
almost 100 percent improvement on delays caused when nursing home patients
were not ready for pick-up. In contrast, an increased emphasis on drivers’ attention to pick-up times produced only slight improvement (<5%) in pick-up time
variances.
This study also reveals that paratransit managers should not rely just on technology solutions to prevent service errors, because safety problems can arise from
a variety of interactions within the service system. These interactions may be
complex and may involve transit workers, riders, health care providers, vehicles,
equipment, software, operating procedures and control systems. Safety problems
can also arise from the combined eﬀect of several relatively small mistakes. Technology alone cannot eliminate these mistakes or control all possible interactions
in the system. Instead, a comprehensive fail-safe methodology that simultaneously
addresses the people, technology and systems components of service delivery at
each stage in the service process can help the manager anticipate and prevent
mistakes that compromise service safety.
It is important to recognize that paratransit service is a multistage process. Moreover, the individual stages are not independent. Some problems that occur at
later stages actually began with mistakes or service errors that originated at earlier
stages. For instance, at the paratransit system in this study, late arrivals, missed
82

Fail-Safe Methods for Paratransit Safety

appointments and poor driving techniques—all of which can endanger a dialysis
patient—are partly aﬀected by poor rider participation skills. Riders who are not
ready at their pick-up times or are frequent no-shows can cause serious delays in
the transport of other passengers. Rider/caregiver training—a fail-safe method
based on the people component of service delivery—can reduce the likelihood
that poor customer participation skills early in the service delivery process will
generate service errors in later service stages.
The fail-safe methodology presented in this study represents a process approach
for anticipating the complex interactions that produce safety problems. At this
paratransit operation, speciﬁc fail-safe solutions were devised and continue to
be reﬁned. While these fail-safe solutions were based on cause and eﬀect relationships that were observed or anticipated, they did not involve mathematical
modeling techniques. Future research is needed to determine if dynamic quantitative modeling techniques could outperform the seasoned, expert manager using
system fail-safe methodology.
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Intermodal Transportation Safety
and Security Issues:
Training against Terrorism
Ronald W. Tarr, Vicki McGurk, and Carol Jones
University of Central Florida

Abstract
Since 9/11, our world has changed. The threats now facing us are extreme and unpredictable. The potential for terrorists to use public transit to deliver bombs or turn
public transit vehicles into bombs underscores the importance of training—training that can help us prepare to deal with the advent of terrorism on a devastating
scale. This paper explains how training in teamwork and decision-making aided the
reaction of mass transit agencies during the 9/11 attacks. It also describes the new
techniques and technologies that can be used to provide even better training for
future attacks.

Introduction
Jennifer Dorn, Federal Transit Administrator, highlighted the risks facing mass
transit when she said:
The State Department reports that in 1991, 20 percent of all violent attacks
worldwide were against transportation targets; by 1998, 40 percent involved
transportation targets, with a growing number directed at bus and rail systems.
The recent attacks on the World Trade Center . . . reminds us all that we must
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respond to a new terrorist reality—terrorism that is well-ﬁnanced, well-organized and ruthless. The credible threat of increasing terrorism directed toward
our nation’s transit systems requires that we take immediate prudent action
to prevent, prepare for and respond to violence—the nature and magnitude of
which was once unimaginable (APTA 2001).
Intermodal transportation systems can be deﬁned as any transport of people or
freight on our soil, we must consider countless ways to prepare for more attacks
and lay out plans to avert another tragedy. This article will focus on the types of
threats from terrorists our intermodal transit systems face (Figure 1.).

Figure 1. Terrorist attacks against transportation by world region, 1998

Source: http://www.bts.gov/publications/the_changing_face_of_transportation/html/ﬁgure_07_09.html

The article is organized into three broad areas:
1. Current situation regarding security and terrorism for intermodal transit
• Response of mass transit agencies on 9/11
• Types of terrorist threats facing intermodal transit facilities and intermodal
transportation systems
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2. Current solutions
• Increased tracking and inspection of certain shipments
• Employee training
• Inspection of priority tracks, tunnels and bridges
• Increasing security for school buses, trucks, subways and trains
3. Future solutions proposed by University of Central Florida’s Center for
Advanced Transportation Systems Simulation (UCF-CATSS), using research
and an advanced application approach to security
• Awareness education and training
• New performance technologies to provide the critical response to terrorist
attacks and also to avoid or defuse threats

Current Situation Regarding Terrorist Security for Intermodal
Transit
The Response of Mass Transit Agencies on 9/11
In the aftermath of 9/11, virtually every mass transit system around Ground Zero
was prepared to help. Many systems provided free transportation, created detours,
accepted each other’s riders, and took food and blankets to victims. All in all, the
outpouring of sympathy and generosity was astounding, and the ability to reroute
lines and get people home showed remarkable training. The response by the mass
transit systems demonstrated that many transit agencies could respond to emergencies, make quick decisions, and come up with creative solutions because they
were prepared.
“America Under Threat: Transit Responds to Terrorism” was a special report
describing how mass transit agencies in cities all over the United States responded
to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In each city’s section of the report, similar actions
were taken—transit employees made quick decisions and depended on teamwork
to help reroute riders and lines so that people could be evacuated from Ground
Zero. When the Federal Aviation Commission closed airports, this rerouting
included transit personnel ﬁnding transportation for passengers stranded at airports, as well as setting up lodging for them. In Austin, Texas, armed police in full
uniform drove the mass transit buses transporting these stranded travelers (APTA
2001).
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Mass transit agencies in cities all over the nation have had to reconsider safety and
security procedures in the face of terrorism. This has caused a rise in requests for
new security devices, such as:
• electronic employee ID targets and vehicular gates at all metro facility
entrance points;
• metro-rail ﬁber optic network, vital for video recording devices;
• programmable intrusion equipment to alert police of the location of any
unauthorized intrusion into the subway system;
• closed-circuit TV and motion detection alarms for metro-rail yard perimeter
fencing and shop facilities;
• personal protection equipment, training and satellite telephones for employees;
• expansion of the chemical emergency sensor program;
• bomb-resistant containers at all metro-rail stations; and
• high-visibility uniformed patrols at vulnerable stations with additional K-9
teams and vehicles for explosive detection.
Figure 2. Closed Circuit TV (CCTV) camera

Source: Fugro OCEANOR, http://www. oceanor.no/
products/cctv
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Security devices are critical to protect passengers from terrorist attacks. They are
also critical to keep our public transportation vehicles from being used as weapons. Norman Mineta, the U.S. Transportation Secretary, speaking at a national
transportation security summit, stated that U.S. transportation systems are “at
risk of being targets of terrorists. They are also at risk of being used as weapons
against Americans—weapons delivery systems used to damage or destroy our
communities” (APTA 2001).
Because of 9/11, many transit agencies have decided to strengthen their current
protocols, while also developing and implementing new internal policies and
procedures. In-house security work groups have been formed; staﬀ members are
participating in seminars on terrorism, bioterrorism, anthrax and other security
and safety measures.
Atlanta and San Francisco transit agencies were able to respond quickly to handle
stranded passengers and create new routes because of previous training. The
Atlanta police had participated in several training programs in preparation for the
1996 Olympic Games (APTA 2001). Training included sending special teams to
biological and chemical response classes oﬀered by the U.S. Army. Atlanta also has
a bomb team equipped with a computerized robot and K-9 units.

Figure 3. K-9 unit training

Source: http://www.ventosakennel.com/training
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The San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) also was prepared because of
its experience with counterterrorism eﬀorts. BART has been involved in local,
regional and national planning for counterterrorism since the Gulf War (APTA
2001). BART hosted a federally sponsored counterterrorism forum in 1997. Since
the subway attack in Tokyo in 1995, BART police, station agents and other key
personnel have received specialized training.
Other cities have participated in training seminars or sent employees for training.
In Cleveland, the Regional Transit Authority (RTA) hosted an FBI terrorist and
operational response training seminar that outlined tactics related to incidents
using explosives or chemical, biological, or nuclear devices.
In addition to the seminars and oﬀ-site training that some cities have had, drills
have provided eﬀective training. A drill in Miami-Dade County (Florida) showed
the transit authorities how easily anyone in a recognizable uniform, even those
without badges, could get into their facilities. This provoked new training to help
employees learn how to challenge people who have no identiﬁcation. In addition,
Miami-Dade has changed access to secure areas, moving from keypad to a proximity card in conjunction with a personal code.
Our mass transit agencies did a highly commendable job in employing their decision-making and teamwork skills to help in a time of great crisis. Now that our
transit systems have shown that they can react to terrorist attacks, we need to
help them acquire the security devices and training they need to be proactive in
preventing another tragedy.
Types of Terrorist Threats Facing Intermodal Transit
Trains. Railroad freight and passengers are extremely vulnerable to terrorist
attacks. Between 1998 and 2003, there were approximately 181 attacks worldwide
on trains and related rail targets such as depots, ticket stations and rail bridges.
Attacks on light rail systems and subway systems are included in this estimate.
These attacks resulted in 431 deaths and several thousand injuries (Riley 2004).
In the aftermath of 9/11, the Association of American Railroads (AAR) and the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) have worked together to ensure
the safety of the railroad system by increasing:
• security of information systems and property;
• tracking and inspection of certain shipments;
• employee training; and
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• inspection of priority tracks, tunnels and bridges.
One of the areas of greatest concern since the terrorist attacks is the security of
the rail industry’s information systems network. On March 23, 2004, before the
Senate Commerce Committee Hearing on Transportation Security, Edward Hamberger, President and Chief Executive Oﬃcer of the AAR, stated: “The industry signiﬁcantly increased cyber-security procedures and techniques. Employee records
were compared with FBI terrorist lists. Security brieﬁngs, like safety brieﬁngs,
became a daily part of many employees’ jobs” (Hamberger 2004).
According to the U.S. Department of Transportation, freight railroads have a large
physical infrastructure and are heavily dependent on information technology in
their daily operations (Mosely 2002). These types of systems are vulnerable to terrorist or hacker activity intended to bring about one of three scenarios.
1. Denial of service—terrorists make a direct attack on an information system
that results in a disruption of service among a number of unprotected
computers on the Internet.
2. Hazardous material control—terrorists gain control of hazardous materials
by cyber attack and cause an accident, resulting in the release of hazardous
materials.
3. Weapons of mass destruction shipment—terrorists gain access to sensitive
freight information systems in order to move weapons around the country.
Subways. The ﬁrst attack on a subway system using weapons of mass destruction
took place in 1995 when the Japanese doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo released sarin
gas into the Tokyo subway system, killing 12 people and sending more than 5,000
to the hospital. Since 9/11, there have been numerous general warnings of possible
terrorist attacks on parts of the ground transportation system, including subways.
Unlike airlines, which have several security checkpoints that screen passengers and
luggage, subways are designed to be easily accessible and are therefore harder to
protect (Council on Foreign Relations 2004).
The physical design of a subway system—enclosed spaces packed with people during speciﬁc times of the day—makes it a tempting target for terrorists. Biological
or chemical attacks in a subway would have devastating results. This is because
air currents above ground, as well as those generated by the movement of trains
through the tunnels, could spread germs or gases throughout a subway station
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and through ventilation systems to the streets above, leading to the infection of
large numbers of people (Council on Foreign Relations 2004).
Trucks. According to Gary Petty, president of the National Private Truck Council
(NPTC), the threat of terrorists using trucks as weapons in the United States is
high, largely because trucks have become the weapon of choice for terrorists. Petty
says, “There have been 150 terrorist attacks worldwide over the last 10 years using
trucks—trucks are the modality of choice for terrorists” (Kilcarr 2003).
A large percentage of trucks carry hazardous freight that would provide terrorists
with a weapon that could be exploded on impact or detonation. Each day, gasoline
tanker trucks across the United States make about 50,000 trips. Another segment
of the trucking ﬂeet hauls other dangerous materials, such as chlorine, that could
be deliberately released. These trucks often are left unattended at refueling depots
with their engines running, or they deliver their loads to deserted, unprotected
areas (Wilen 2003).
Buses. Buses remain a favorite target for terrorists. According to the FBI, between
1920 and 2000, nearly 40 percent of mass transit targets internationally were
buses, including school buses. Why would terrorists target school buses? Because,
basically, they are easy targets—they have predictable routes and are highly visible.
In addition, although schoolchildren pose no threat to terrorists, by hijacking a bus
full of children, terrorists can “crush the heart” of a nation (Paul 2004a). Because
school buses are easy targets, state directors of student transportation concur that
antiterrorism programs are vital for school bus safety. Terrorism on school buses
ranks third on a list of potential U.S. targets. When you consider that there are
450,000 school buses in daily service, the ranking is not surprising (Paul 2004b).
In the aftermath of 9/11, school security has much broader applications than it
did when domestic violence was the extent of school and transportation security
concerns. At least four high-proﬁle hijackings have occurred in recent years in the
United States. Although these hijackings were not committed by terrorists, they
still showed the ease with which an unauthorized person could gain control of
a school bus. Although the United States has not had an actual terrorist attack
against a school bus, school buses with children on board were targeted in Israel,
Thailand and Malaysia in just the past two years (Paul 2004a).
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Current Solutions
Increased Tracking and Inspection of Certain Shipments
Embedded processors, such as radio frequency identiﬁcation tags, e-sensors and
e-seals that are read by electronic readers at all points, are increasingly being used
to track freight shipments as they make their way across the country. E-sensors
can detect and document changes to a shipment that occur along its route. For
example, if terrorists were to tamper with a container of hazardous waste, e-sensors would notify the proper security organization of the container intrusion
(National Research Council 2003).
Other types of security devices being used to track shipments and employee activity include cryptography, the basis for most secure Web-based activities; biometric
devices that identify persons on the basis of one or more physical attributes, such
as a ﬁngerprint or retina pattern; and wireless communication tracking systems
that report shipment data to control points (National Research Council 2003).
Employee Training
Train operators and employees are routinely taught emergency response skills.
These skills were critical to limiting casualties in the immediate aftermath of the
9/11 terrorist attacks—for instance, when Port Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH)
trains helped evacuate more than 5,000 persons from the basement of the World
Trade Center. Since the 9/11 attacks, passenger systems have conducted further
drills, testing and preparation for emergency situations. Some systems are experimenting with chemical and biological detection systems. The Washington, D.C.,
Metro subway system recently initiated a program for identifying suspicious
packages and luggage. In addition, personnel and passengers are trained to report
suspicious behavior and be ready for evacuation and emergency actions (Riley
2004).
Many transit agencies build on their existing emergency procedures to integrate
steps needed in response to a terrorist attack. For example, the Houston Metro
has conducted a terrorism response training exercise with the U.S. Department of
Transportation involving local, state and federal emergency responders. In general,
emergency plans used in the transit environment provide guidance for reporting
and evaluating the incident, using the incident command system, notifying emergency response personnel or agencies, protecting personnel and equipment at the
incident site, dispatching emergency response personnel and equipment to the
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site, evacuating passengers, providing brieﬁngs and information updates, managing the emergency, and restoring the system to normal (Boyd and Sullivan 2000).
Inspection of Priority Tracks, Tunnels and Bridges
Following the 9/11 attacks, bridges and tunnels into and out of New York City
were heavily patrolled by police oﬃcers and the National Guard, and truck trafﬁc was restricted. Maintenance doors on high-proﬁle bridges, such as the Golden
Gate Bridge and the Bay Bridge, were sealed shut to prevent terrorists from
damaging bridge cables and anchors. In July 2002, Amtrak received a $76 million
federal grant to make New York City rail tunnels safer, including the modernizing
of ventilation and communication systems and improving emergency access and
other measures (Council on Foreign Relations 2004).
Increased Security for Subways, Trucks and Buses
Subways. To prepare emergency workers to handle terrorist attacks, the Washington, D.C., Metro subway system began training a select group of commuters on
ways to evacuate trains and subway tunnels and help fellow passengers during a
rail disaster (Layton 2004). Metro Transit Police Chief Polly L. Hanson recognizes
the vulnerability of subway tunnels to explosive devices and has pointed out that
the tunnels pose particular hazards during an emergency, which requires specialized training. The Metro training program includes walking the volunteer passengers into dark subway tunnels to teach them to navigate live tracks as trains
roll by. “When you walk down the street, you don’t have a third rail that’s got
750 volts,” Hanson said, referring to the high-voltage rail that powers the trains
(Layton 2004).
Trucks. Although trucks haul nearly 70 percent of the nation’s freight, the federal
government spends signiﬁcantly more on airplane safety than it does on trucking
safety (Center for Strategic and International Studies 2004). However, recognizing
the inherent security problems of the trucking industry and the fact that truckers are on the road 24 hours per day, the Department of Homeland Security has
pledged a $19.3 million grant to Highway Watch, a program formed in 1998, to
give truckers training in spotting terrorist activities and to provide a national hot
line to report trouble. During a one-day training session, truckers learn about
truck bomb terrorism around the world, how terrorist attacks play out and the
ways someone might case a target. So far, about 400,000 professional truckers
have been trained, with many more to go (Center for Strategic and International
Studies 2004).
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There also have been security measures taken to ensure control of a truck that has
been stolen or hijacked. In 2002, the U.S. Department of Transportation began a
two-year project to test satellite-tracking systems with devices that can disable
a truck if an unauthorized driver takes control. GPS (global positioning system)
tracking also is being used by ﬂeet operators to detect the exact location of trucks
as they follow their routes and make deliveries (Wilen 2003).
Buses. Some recommendations to provide transportation safety for buses include
identifying security threats and suspicious people, monitoring suspicious objects
and activities, responding to a security, incident and reporting suspicions to the
dispatcher.
Video cameras and GPS are two technologies that could be added to enhance
bus security and help thwart terrorists. GPS allows transportation managers to
know where the buses are at any given moment. In addition to using GPS to track
commercial buses, Lee County Florida is thumbprinting students as they board
and exit school buses so that schools know not only where each bus is, but which
children are on board.
Although these technologies will be highly eﬀective in tracking hijacked buses,
they will not protect riders from other terrorist acts. For example, many buses run
on gasoline, which is highly ﬂammable. Converting buses to diesel fuel, which is
more diﬃcult to cause to explode, would be another safeguard against an attack.
Unfortunately, in the case of school buses, school budgets do not stretch to cover
all of these safety measures.
Training bus drivers and teachers to be prepared to implement safety plans is
another measure many of our schools are trying. Modesto City (California) schools
held a simulated training session for their school bus drivers, in which the adult
drivers pretended to be students on a bus that was “hijacked” by “terrorists.”
The training was powerful because members of the County Sheriﬀ’s Department
SWAT team, pretending to be the terrorists, wielded real guns (which shot blanks)
and demanded to send messages. Participants said the training was frightening
but also highly eﬀective (Chrismer 1999).

Future Solutions Proposed by UCF-CATSS
It has long been recognized that the key element in prevention and proper
response to security threats is operators, drivers and personnel who are well
trained and prepared to act when they encounter dangerous or threatening situ97
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ations. When personnel on the scene can react and organize a proper response,
situations can be resolved. UCF-CATSS was established to conduct research and
to provide simulation and advanced learning technologies to enhance the performance of the transportation community.
Although traditional training practices are important, the military and the Federal
Aviation Authority have learned that interactive methods that place someone in a
dangerous virtual world provide realistic training in a safe environment. The simulated situation provides opportunities for trainees to consider their actions and to
try out diﬀerent solutions. Virtual worlds and simulation are excellent media for
security training, requiring role-playing and learning technologies that are focused
on the most pressing needs of the community.
Awareness Education and Training
The Federal Transit Authority has developed numerous guidelines to provide
practical assistance to transit personnel and other individuals and organizations
whose responsibility is to plan for, manage and recover from emergencies and
disasters. Transit Watch is a campaign intended to raise the awareness of transit
employees, riders and the general public. The campaign is also designed to help
foster the role of transit as a safe facility in communities across the country.
The challenge to this campaign is how to raise employees’ awareness without scaring them. In addition, if too much information is disseminated, employees may
ignore it, especially if it is being distributed in the same way as other safety information. Identifying innovative measures for informing employees and being able
to measure the utility of these measures is one of the approaches that UCF-CATSS
will be implementing, using a broad multimedia approach.
New Performance Technologies
Simulation Technology. Simulation is the ultimate training technology. It allows
transit agency employees to “encounter” a terrorist situation and then initiate an
immediate action. Simulation technology can oﬀer training in a realistic, virtual
situation, one that mimics day-to-day transit activities and requires an immediate response to deter or mitigate a serious incident. The transit agency employee
initiating the immediate response could be a bus or rail operator, station agent,
or someone working in close proximity to signiﬁcant numbers of patrons and
other employees. However, all employees—including executive, administrative,
maintenance and security employees—may ﬁnd themselves in a situation where
immediate action is needed.
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Knowing what to do in an emergency is critical for protecting and saving lives.
Waiting for emergency response from police and ﬁre crews may take as long as
10 to 30 minutes, depending on the type of incident. For example, in a suspected
chemical attack or spill, the ﬁre department’s HAZMAT team members may
take several minutes to get to the scene, put on their breathing apparatus and
chemical suits, and gain access to the site. This does not mean that a transit agency
employee is expected to confront a criminal or terrorist and put his or her life at
risk. Instead, the employee can observe, assess and take immediate actions that
reduce risks.
Computer Gaming Technology. One area in which UCF has done extensive research
is the use of personal computer (PC)-based computer games as an alternative
to traditional education and awareness. This is especially useful with the newer,
younger employees who have grown up playing computer games. Several oﬀ-theshelf PC games have the potential to provide engaging, realistic information as long
as proper scenarios are developed and the games are implemented appropriately.
For example, gaming architecture could be adjusted to allow for user-controlled
enemy combatants. Users could carry out scenarios to thwart them. City transit
systems are frequent targets and users could plan surveillance and security tactics.
Allowing some gamers to be “the enemy” would add innovative complexity to the
games and also provide valuable information about the variety of ways an enemy
might attack a target.
The military services and UCF have been looking at the use of game-based learning for over ﬁve years now. Sponsored by the Navy, the Army and the Department
of Defense, UCF has developed several techniques to tailor game applications for
education and training requirements.

Summary
Our community is faced with new challenges in security and, in some cases, these
new challenges are almost unbelievable. Many transportation personnel cannot
comprehend what happened on 9/11, nor can they fathom the future attacks they
may confront. The events of 9/11 seem more those of a Hollywood script than
something real. Although it is not easy for people to forget such a tragedy, many
return to business as usual because that is the way they choose to deal with what
happened. But the world has changed. We no longer can expect “business as usual”
and we must ensure that people consider events that might occur.
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Only by taking a systematic, performance-oriented approach that is relevant,
credible, and engaging and that can be tailored as needed can we ensure that
personnel are prepared to take immediate and appropriate action when faced
with perilous situations. Much can be learned from the military and the Federal
Aviation Administration’s work in training their people to deal with dangerous
situations and in their use of desktop computers and simulation technologies
to provide training. We must use these technologies and the knowledge that
has been gained to prepare intermodal transit employees and riders to deal with
future potential terrorist activities.
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